If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature -
since we are merely one among many creatures in nature. The fact that
every society we have ever created incorporated some - or more -
rights for its participants is no argument for inalienability though
it might be an argument for some inherent tendency towards toleration
in all forms of life.

However, we certainly possess a considerable genetic capacity which
separates us in many ways from other creatures. We may reconstuct the
past and envisage a future. We may construct societies with a
deliberateness denied to other creatures. We also possess a
fundamental capacity to act at our own behest - i.e. a freedom of
choice.

Throughout most of our recent - i.e. in the last 2000,3000 years -
history we were denied the full exercise of this freedom. We have now
redressed this wrong in most parts of the world. We have created
strong societies where millions, indeed hundreds of millions, of free
individuals may cohabit in relative harmony. It is a considerable
achievement.

Since in the past we have been forced to give undue recognition to far
lesser achievements we ought today to recognise our own
mass-achievement. We ought to value our own creation of our own
rights. Our obvious need - and wish - for a moral component in our
lives ought to be satisfied by this creation. But there is no such
valuation, and no such satisfaction, today. Our communal rights have
been whisked away and become a mere individual possession to be added
to ON DEMAND! This was only to expected. Freedom, after all, is an
intoxicant and we should expect some intoxication. But the result is a
diminuition and a devaluation of our achievements which in turn leads
to alienation and an indifference which can damage the well-springs of
our societies.

It is the duty of those elements in society - in every society
throughout history - concerned to curb the natual excesses of that
society to create a countervailing force bringing about a recogition -
and a revaluation - of what we have achieved. Otherwise triviality
will be our only valuation.

Humanisation seeks to impart such a valuation.

Best wishes

Joseph H

www.humanisation.org

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Tue, 1 Dec 2004 05:30:25 GMT

on Thursday.
#
# President Clinton recommended to state and city officials a recently
# released Justice Department report on how these programs can be set up
# to pass court review and work effectively.
#
# The risk of selective enforcement is high, and it's not hard to predict
# which neighborhoods will be the focus of police attention, and which
# will be ignored.

Get a load of this:

* "Police Applaud Ruling to Allow Restrictions on Gang Suspects"
* By Tim Golden, The New York Times, February 1, 1997
*
* Law enforcement officials in California today praised a State Supreme
* Court decision that allows cities to prohibit SUSPECTED gang members
* from standing together on street corners, climbing trees, wearing beepers
* and doing any number of other things that are legal for ordinary citizens.
*
* The ruling was in a case for the city of San Jose to prevent 38 Hispanic
* men and women suspected of membership in a street gang from frequenting
* a four-block neighborhood that the police said the gang had terrorized.
*
* "We're thrilled," said Los Angelos County Attorney Gil Garcetti.
*
* State and local law enforcement officials predicted that the court ruling
* would prompt a wave of similar legislation across California.
*
* Because the San Jose City Attorney's office brought action against the
* defendants under a civil procedure, the defendants were not guaranteed
* the standard protections of criminal law.
*
* "Liberty unrestrained is an invitation to anarchy," Justice Brown wrote.
*
* The defendants may not engage in any form of public association: "standing,
* sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view"
* in the neighborhood, or face 6 months in jail.
*
* They further may not: "climb trees or fences, make loud noises, possess
* wire cutters or marbles [What???], wear particular clothes, make certain
* hand signs, or carry markin

From:	Ryan Tanaka
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	28 Nov 2004 12:58:51 -0800

joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in message news:<2b0ce0c5.0411280342.3e1a73d1@posting.google.com>...

The concept of rights is just an invented concept by people who want
to take things for granted, anyway.

Ryan

> If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature -
> since we are merely one among many creatures in nature. The fact that
> every society we have ever created incorporated some - or more -
> rights for its participants is no argument for inalienability though
> it might be an argument for some inherent tendency towards toleration
> in all forms of life.
>
> However, we certainly possess a considerable genetic capacity which
> separates us in many ways from other creatures. We may reconstuct the
> past and envisage a future. We may construct societies with a
> deliberateness denied to other creatures. We also possess a
> fundamental capacity to act at our own behest - i.e. a freedom of
> choice.
>
> Throughout most of our recent - i.e. in the last 2000,3000 years -
> history we were denied the full exercise of this freedom. We have now
> redressed this wrong in most parts of the world. We have created
> strong societies where millions, indeed hundreds of millions, of free
> individuals may cohabit in relative harmony. It is a considerable
> achievement.
>
> Since in the past we have been forced to give undue recognition to far
> lesser achievements we ought today to recognise our own
> mass-achievement. We ought to value our own creation of our own
> rights. Our obvious need - and wish - for a moral component in our
> lives ought to be satisfied by this creation. But there is no such
> valuation, and no such satisfaction, today. Our communal rights have
> been whisked away and become a mere individual possession to be added
> to ON DEMAND! This was only to expected. Freedom, after all, is an
> intoxicant and we should expect some intoxication. But the result is a
> diminuition and a devaluation of our achievements which in turn leads
> to alienation and an indifference which can damage the well-springs of
> our societies.
>
> It is the duty of those elements in society - in every society
> throughout history - concerned to curb the natual excesses of that
> society to create a countervailing force bringing about a recogition -
> and a revaluation - of what we have achieved. Otherwise triviality
> will be our only valuation.
>
> Humanisation seeks to impart such a valuation.
>
>
> Best wishes
>
> Joseph H
>
>
> www.humanisation.org

From:	ralph
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Sun, 28 Nov 2004 22:57:08 +0000

In message <2b0ce0c5.0411280342.3e1a73d1@posting.google.com>, Joseph H
writes
>If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature -
>since we are merely one among many creatures in nature. The fact that
>every society we have ever created incorporated some - or more -
>rights for its participants is no argument for inalienability though
>it might be an argument for some inherent tendency towards toleration
>in all forms of life.
>
>However, we certainly possess a considerable genetic capacity which
>separates us in many ways from other creatures. We may reconstuct the
>past and envisage a future. We may construct societies with a
>deliberateness denied to other creatures. We also possess a
>fundamental capacity to act at our own behest - i.e. a freedom of
>choice.
>
>Throughout most of our recent - i.e. in the last 2000,3000 years -
>history we were denied the full exercise of this freedom. We have now
>redressed this wrong in most parts of the world. We have created
>strong societies where millions, indeed hundreds of millions, of free
>individuals may cohabit in relative harmony. It is a considerable
>achievement.

This is very true, Joseph, and you are right to remind us of it.
>
>Since in the past we have been forced to give undue recognition to far
>lesser achievements we ought today to recognise our own
>mass-achievement. We ought to value our own creation of our own
>rights.

I find it quite humbling to see voters in new democracies queuing for
hours to vote, sometimes in blistering sun, sometimes in torrential
rain. It makes our own indifference to our possession of this right
shameful. Yes, you may say that ti doesn't make much difference who you
vote for, or you may feel that the politicians don't make a lot of
difference to your life. But in my view you have a duty to vote just to
register the gratitude you should feel for having that privilege - or
right, if you prefer it.

> Our obvious need - and wish - for a moral component in our
>lives ought to be satisfied by this creation. But there is no such
>valuation, and no such satisfaction, today. Our communal rights have
>been whisked away and become a mere individual possession to be added
>to ON DEMAND!

Not whisked away, rather ignored, I feel. Boring, as youth describes
almost everything.

> This was only to expected. Freedom, after all, is an
>intoxicant and we should expect some intoxication. But the result is a
>diminuition and a devaluation of our achievements which in turn leads
>to alienation and an indifference which can damage the well-springs of
>our societies.
>
>It is the duty of those elements in society - in every society
>throughout history - concerned to curb the natual excesses of that
>society to create a countervailing force bringing about a recogition -
>and a revaluation - of what we have achieved. Otherwise triviality
>will be our only valuation.

Absolutely. Keep at it, Joseph.

--
ralph

From:	none at none.net
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Mon, 29 Nov 2004 04:16:24 -0600

On 29 Nov 2004 08:56:03 GMT, Publius wrote:

>none@none.net wrote in news:rhmlq0p3jp7olbr96fgrfj7objt7o9dtug@4ax.com:

>
>> To speak of rights , as an abstract privilege inherent in human
>> nature is to give them a reality they don't possess.
>
>The fact that rights are artifacts of culture does not entail that they are
>not real. Neither do computers or impressionist paintings, nor square
>roots.

I was making a statement of degree not of kind....

There is a tendency to elevate human rights to the level of, say, a
law of physics. A society may decide to prohibit slavery or not but it
cannot decide to obey the laws of gravity or not.

Ultimately a societies's prohibition against slavery is no more or
less real then when it decides to drive on the left or right side of
the road. Both are more or less arbitrary human value judgements.

Or, to put it another way, "Murder" is a human value judgement that
has no meaning outside of human societies. The concept of "Murder"
does not exist in nature.

From:	Marvin Edwards
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Tue, 1 Dec 2004 07:13:11 GMT

keep
* it. Alvarez's lawyer called his bluff and got the money back after
* a full year had elapsed. Loss of a full year's interest and $5000 in
* legal fees were the result.
*
* The government's abrupt assault shocked Paolo Alvarez to his core,
* leaving him with powerful feelings of fearful despair and isolation.
*
* While the fear was obviously justified, the feeling of isolation was
* way off the mark. He has lots of company.
[snip]
*
* The federal government seized the home of an elderly couple under the
* Drug War's "facilitation" provision. The judge was so embarrassed he
* gave the couple half the cash value of their house back. The drugs had
* belonged to the teenaged-grandson. "The whole program is a nightmare,"
* said their lawyer, "If it keeps up, the Justice Department is going to
* be the largest property owner in Connecticut."
[snip]
*
* Between 1985 and 1993, as a result of more than 200,000 forfeitures, the
* Justice Department Asset Forfeiture Fund took in over $3.2 billion.
*
* In 1993 alone the department took in $556 million, twenty times more
* than it did when the program began in 1985.

And what were some of the reasons of the dramatic
increase in forfeitures between 1985 and 1993?

What caused it to increase by more than a MAGNITUDE?

* "Above the Law", by David Burnham, ISBN 0-684-80699-1, 1996
*
* In June 1989, the Deputy Attorney General ordered the nation's U.S.
* attorneys to "take all possible actions" on forfeitures, even if it meant
* dropping other matters. "You will be expected to divert personnel from
* other activities."
*
* One year later, the Attorney General himself warned the U.S. attorneys
* that the Justice Department had fallen

From:	ralph
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Mon, 6 Dec 2004 19:15:10 +0000

In message <4ce617c0.0412060037.42f7aa96@posting.google.com>, Zinnic
writes
>
> I agree that it is semantics. I find it as a serious problem in
>philosophical discussion. After a career in science, I arrogantly
>believed that I could be a player in philosophy without a formal
>education in the field. I stand corrected! However, I am dismayed by
>the untrammelled use of ambiguous words in philosophical discussion.
>Insistence on specificity may be cumbersome but is essential to
>invalidate the nonsensical conclusions that arise from 'customary
>usage' of terms. For example, what is a fictitious contract? Is it a
>contract described in a novel or is it an invalid contract? It may have
>a specific meaning to lawyers but it is ambiguous for non-lawyers. I
>can distinguish between a valid (real?) and a non-valid contract but a
>real versus an 'unreal' (invalid ?) contract leaves me confused.
>
>What is a real theory as opposed to a pseudo theory? Is a pseudo theory
>one that is incorrect or one that someone has advanced knowing it was
>incorrect. As a scientist, my understanding is that a theory (correct
>or incorrect) is advanced in good faith with the open challenge to
>prove it incorrect. One distiguishes between degrees of love, types of
>numbers or motives by the use of adjectives (as you used in your post).
>However, describing a love or a motive as 'real' rather than true,
>prostitutes the 'real' meaning of real.
>
>Functions are not real in the sense that entities are real. Functions
>do not exist, they occur. Functions that do not occur are in the same
>category as entities that do not exist.
>
>Pardon my naivety, but I do not accept that truth is synonymous with
>reality. A true concept (real?) is no more an entity than is a false
>concept (unreal?), though both may be functions of someones brain.
>There are 'things' and there are 'occurences' (concepts etc). I'll take
>the easy conclusion. Things have substance, 'things' that happen
>to them do not!
>Ergo - things are the REAL things.

Have you read any Popper? He wrote extensively about the philosophy of
science as well as more generally.

He suggested three "worlds". World I is the world revealed by our senses
(and the extensions to them which we have invented).

World II is the world of mental states: what goes on in our heads, which
may or may not relate to World I.

World III is the world of objective knowledge: the contents of
libraries, databases, museums. These have arisen from interactions
between the first two worlds, but now have an independence. Even if
everyone forget about Einstein and his theories, they exist in records,
and are available to be rediscovered if that were necessary.

He called his approach critical rationalism, and he is sometimes so
rational that it hurts, but does illuminate most of the problems to
which you allude, in my view.

--
ralph

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	29 Nov 2004 07:40:02 GMT

joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in
news:2b0ce0c5.0411280342.3e1a73d1@posting.google.com:

> If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature -
> since we are merely one among many creatures in nature.

As it stands, that is a non sequiter. Does it follow that because we walk
upright, so does every creature in nature?

Who has and does not have rights, and what rights they may have, may well
depend on the nature of the creatures in question, and on the nature of
rights.

From:	Joseph H
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	29 Nov 2004 11:05:41 -0800

Publius wrote in message news:...
> joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in
> news:2b0ce0c5.0411280342.3e1a73d1@posting.google.com:
>
> > If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature -
> > since we are merely one among many creatures in nature.
>
> As it stands, that is a non sequiter. Does it follow that because we walk
> upright, so does every creature in nature?

Trying to get my head around that. I think your's is the non sequiter,
if I may be so bold as to suggest such a thing. Walking upright is an
obvious possession. We visibly do it. Asserting that we have
inalienable rights is staking a claim on nature, a claim for which
there is no evidence at all. Every creature has its own way of walking
- or moving. No creature other than ourselves insists on the
possession of an inalienable set of rights. Ergo, as the man says, the
claim is tendentious in the extreme.
>
> Who has and does not have rights, and what rights they may have, may well
> depend on the nature of the creatures in question, and on the nature of
> rights.
Can't see that. Other abilities stem from the physical, instinctual
and cerebral capacity of the creatures in question. Rights have no
such provenance or support.

Best wishes

Joseph H

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Mon, 29 Nov 2004 21:36:06 GMT

joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in

>> > If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature
>> > - since we are merely one among many creatures in nature.
>>
>> As it stands, that is a non sequiter. Does it follow that because we
>> walk upright, so does every creature in nature?
>
> Trying to get my head around that. I think your's is the non sequiter,
> if I may be so bold as to suggest such a thing.

Your original statement (above) suggests that any property we humans
might possess must also be possessed by all other creatures (and thus
that if other creatures do not possess some property asserted, neither do
we). Which is obviously false.

> Asserting that we have
> inalienable rights is staking a claim on nature, a claim for which
> there is no evidence at all.

But it isn't. Rights are not natural properties of persons or any other
creatures, as are, say, mass or hair color (although admittedly some
rights theorists have suggested that they are). Rights are stipulated
properties of persons. We attribute that property--a certain right--to a
person in accordance with a specific rule for attributing that property.
The rule states that whenever certain other facts are true about that
person, then he/she has a certain right. Being "married" is a similar
property. That is not a natural property either -- it is a stipulated
property that we apply to persons when certain historical facts are true
about them (they have followed whatever procedure a given society
specifies for creating that relationship). If they've followed that
procedure, then they acquire the property of being married.

There are many such properties. E.g., being a Shriner, or a Democrat, or
being in debt.

None of those properties are natural, but they are quite real, and there
is usually no difficulty determining whether any given person possesses
such properties or not. And of course no other creatures ever have any of
those properties.

>> Who has and does not have rights, and what rights they may have, may
>> well depend on the nature of the creatures in question, and on the
>> nature of rights.

> Can't see that. Other abilities stem from the physical, instinctual
> and cerebral capacity of the creatures in question. Rights have no
> such provenance or support.

Rights are not abilities, but stipulated properties of persons. They have
them whenever certain other facts are true about them, just as with the
other properties mentioned.

Rights claims always have the form, "P has a right to x." You validate
such claims, not by examining P under a microscope or with an X-ray
machine, but by looking at the history of the relationship between P and
x, just as you would validate the claim, "P is married to Q" by examing
the history of their relationship.

You might want to check the essay (cited previously) "It All Depends on
Rights," here: http://209.126.173.140

From:	Joseph H
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	2 Dec 2004 09:26:52 -0800

"Publius" wrote in message news:...
> joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in
>
> >> > If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature
> >> > - since we are merely one among many creatures in nature.
>
>> Your original statement (above) suggests that any property we
humans
> might possess must also be possessed by all other creatures (and thus
> that if other creatures do not possess some property asserted, neither do
> we). Which is obviously false.

Sorry..but my statement does not suggest this. My statement refers to
something we call "inalienable rights". These, by definition, must be
some natural property that we are deemed to possess - not an ability,
or a skill, or a characteristic, or a computer (!) but an innate
possession. My point was that since human beings are made - literally
- of the same stuff as all other creatures and are as much a product
of the evolution and diversification of life as all other creatures
then if we are deemed to possess such rights then so do all other
creatures.
>
> > Asserting that we have
> > inalienable rights is staking a claim on nature, a claim for which
> > there is no evidence at all.
>
> But it isn't. Rights are not natural properties of persons or any other
> creatures, as are, say, mass or hair color (although admittedly some
> rights theorists have suggested that they are). Rights are stipulated
> properties of persons. We attribute that property--a certain right--to a
> person in accordance with a specific rule for attributing that property.
> The rule states that whenever certain other facts are true about that
> person, then he/she has a certain right. Being "married" is a similar
> property. That is not a natural property either -- it is a stipulated
> property that we apply to persons when certain historical facts are true
> about them (they have followed whatever procedure a given society
> specifies for creating that relationship). If they've followed that
> procedure, then they acquire the property of being married.
>
> There are many such properties. E.g., being a Shriner, or a Democrat, or
> being in debt.
>
> None of those properties are natural, but they are quite real, and there
> is usually no difficulty determining whether any given person possesses
> such properties or not. And of course no other creatures ever have any of
> those properties.

But I have no problem with all of this. I agree with it totally. My
problem is with something called "inalienable rights" which, by
definition or assumption, precede or transcend all these constructed
or agreed rights you mention.
>
> >> Who has and does not have rights, and what rights they may have, may
> >> well depend on the nature of the creatures in question, and on the
> >> nature of rights.
>
> > Can't see that. Other abilities stem from the physical, instinctual
> > and cerebral capacity of the creatures in question. Rights have no
> > such provenance or support.
>
> Rights are not abilities, but stipulated properties of persons. They have
> them whenever certain other facts are true about them, just as with the
> other properties mentioned.
Thank you for telling me rights are not abilities. I was simply making
the point that all our other attributes have a particular origin or
provenance - physiological etc - whereas the claim for rights has no
such support. It is simply a claim. The rights you speak of do have a
provenance, membership of a club etc.

Actually, your posting has helped me sharpen my original intent. I
said rights - meaning human rights generally - should be a moral
imperative. What I meant by that - but didn't say - is that we should
be committed to establishing and maintaining particular standards of
living for all human beings. This should be our moral purpose. The
claim that inalienable rights exist in one sense promotes and directs
any such intention but in another, much deeper, sense it weakens and
deflects it because we take the claim so much for granted that we lose
the zeal and the passion necessary for any such transformation to
occur. Mine is a fierce humanism. It says we make our own society and
must continue to value that society - because in the absence of that
society there is chaos.

Hope that clears up a few things.

Joseph H

www.humanisation.org
>

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	02 Dec 2004 22:30:36 GMT

joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in
news:2b0ce0c5.0412020926.6a181c76@posting.google.com:

Thoughtful post, Joseph. Refreshing to see in this forum.

> Sorry..but my statement does not suggest this. My statement refers to
> something we call "inalienable rights". These, by definition, must be
> some natural property that we are deemed to possess - not an ability,
> or a skill, or a characteristic, or a computer (!) but an innate
> possession.

That is how rights, and especially "natural rights," have often been
construed. But it is an erroneous construction, and makes rights
vulnerable to the sort of criticisms Bentham and many others have raised
against them ("nonsense on stilts").

Rights are not natural properties, but stipulated properties. They are
socially defined properties, like being married and the others I
mentioned. P has a right to x if P was the first possessor of x (that is,
it's creator or discoverer), or if P acquired x via a chain of consent
from its first possessor. Thus, if you take a chunk of mahogany and some
glue and catgut (all of which you've acquired legitimately), and craft a
violin, then you have a right to the violin. Or if you buy a violin from
Stradivarius, who created it, then you also now have the right to it.
That socially-defined property now attaches to you, just as, if you
follow the steps stipulated in your community for marrying, *that*
property (being married) then attaches to you.

Yet, though rights are not natural properties, there are indeed
inalienable natural rights. A "natural" right is simply a right to
something you have naturally first possessed. For example, your life,
your body, your various natural abilities and talents, etc. Natural
rights are "natural," not in the sense of being natural properties, but
because they are rights to natural possessions. You have them because
your relationships with those things are consistent with the first
possession rule.

And some of those "natural" rights are of course inalienable. You may
have a right to a house, but that right is alienable. You can transfer
the house, and your property right in it, to someone else. That is only a
common, not a natural right. But you can't transfer your life, or your
skill at playing the violin, to someone else (you can perhaps teach them
how to play, but that is not the same thing). Thus, some of the natural
rights are inalienable.

> My point was that since human beings are made - literally
> - of the same stuff as all other creatures and are as much a product
> of the evolution and diversification of life as all other creatures
> then if we are deemed to possess such rights then so do all other
> creatures.

Once we realize that rights are not natural properties, but stipulated
ones, this becomes less a problem. Animals possess many of the same
natural attributes (differing more in degree than in kind) that we do,
but we do not stipulate rights to them because we don't think they are
themselves capable of grasping the concept, and wielding it correctly (or
at all). For the same reason, we don't describe a pair of Canada geese or
coyotes as being "married," even though they mate for life. Having
rights, like being married, imposes duties on both the rights holder and
upon others, all of whom must be capable of recognizing and understanding
those duties. It would be pointless to attribute either property to
creatures who cannot grasp the duties entailed.

> But I have no problem with all of this. I agree with it totally. My
> problem is with something called "inalienable rights" which, by
> definition or assumption, precede or transcend all these constructed
> or agreed rights you mention.

Natural rights (as above defined) don't transcend any other rights. They
are stipulated properties defined the same way. They are simply rights
that attach to natural possessions. There is an important difference with
those rights, though: we can usually claim them categorically. Common
rights are always vulnerable to challenge -- if someone else claims your
violin, we have to settle the dispute by determining which of you is
actually the first possessor, or whose title chain can be traced to the
first possessor. But natural rights are immune to such challenges.
Someone else's claim to be the first possessor of your life would be
implausible on its face.

> Actually, your posting has helped me sharpen my original intent. I
> said rights - meaning human rights generally - should be a moral
> imperative. What I meant by that - but didn't say - is that we should
> be committed to establishing and maintaining particular standards of
> living for all human beings. This should be our moral purpose.

There are two conceptions of rights at large these days. One of these is
the natural rights tradition, which is usually attributed to Hobbes,
Locke, and their successors. But this tradition is actually much older
than that. It originates in English common law, and particularly the
rules adopted by the Royal Courts for settling all kinds of civil
disputes. By the time Hobbes and Locke wrote, the idea that individuals
held rights was well-established. The US Bill of Rights and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen canonize this tradition.

The newer conception is the human rights tradition, probably best
exemplified today by the UN Charter on Human Rights. In this tradition
rights are construed as moral claims to various things thought to be
necessary for life, or for a quality of life above some threshhold.

Those two conceptions conflict. Resolving that conflict requires much
argument.

From:	Joseph H
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	5 Dec 2004 12:39:18 -0800

Publius wrote in message news:...
> joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in
> news:2b0ce0c5.0412020926.6a181c76@posting.google.com:
>
> Thoughtful post, Joseph. Refreshing to see in this forum.
Refreshing generally. I hope I'm not going to seem obtuse - but I
probably am.
>
> > Sorry..but my statement does not suggest this. My statement refers to
> > something we call "inalienable rights". These, by definition, must be
> > some natural property that we are deemed to possess - not an ability,
> > or a skill, or a characteristic, or a computer (!) but an innate
> > possession.
>
> That is how rights, and especially "natural rights," have often been
> construed. But it is an erroneous construction, and makes rights
> vulnerable to the sort of criticisms Bentham and many others have raised
> against them ("nonsense on stilts").

>
> Rights are not natural properties, but stipulated properties. They are
> socially defined properties, like being married and the others I
> mentioned. P has a right to x if P was the first possessor of x (that is,
> it's creator or discoverer), or if P acquired x via a chain of consent
> from its first possessor. Thus, if you take a chunk of mahogany and some
> glue and catgut (all of which you've acquired legitimately), and craft a
> violin, then you have a right to the violin. Or if you buy a violin from
> Stradivarius, who created it, then you also now have the right to it.
> That socially-defined property now attaches to you, just as, if you
> follow the steps stipulated in your community for marrying, *that*
> property (being married) then attaches to you.
But Bentham et al were not talking about stipulated properties. Nor am
I. I - and they - were talking about a claim to something far grander.
>
> Yet, though rights are not natural properties, there are indeed
> inalienable natural rights. A "natural" right is simply a right to
> something you have naturally first possessed. For example, your life,
> your body, your various natural abilities and talents, etc. Natural
> rights are "natural," not in the sense of being natural properties, but
> because they are rights to natural possessions. You have them because
> your relationships with those things are consistent with the first
> possession rule.
>
> And some of those "natural" rights are of course inalienable. You may
> have a right to a house, but that right is alienable. You can transfer
> the house, and your property right in it, to someone else. That is only a
> common, not a natural right. But you can't transfer your life, or your
> skill at playing the violin, to someone else (you can perhaps teach them
> how to play, but that is not the same thing). Thus, some of the natural
> rights are inalienable.
Okay, I understand what you are saying. And I thank you for your very
patient exposition. But I still hold to my original view (I told you:
obtuse!).We would certainly wish to have the right(s) you mentioned;
we would certainly wish to live in a society in which such a right /
claim was protected; we would certainly wish to spend our time among
people who respected our claim...but ultimately it is a claim, an
assertion, a self-allocation, one that could easily be, and all too
often IS easily, swept aside by hostile forces.
>
> Once we realize that rights are not natural properties, but stipulated
> ones, this becomes less a problem. Animals possess many of the same
> natural attributes (differing more in degree than in kind) that we do,
> but we do not stipulate rights to them because we don't think they are
> themselves capable of grasping the concept, and wielding it correctly (or
> at all).(snip)
Yes, but the fact that we possess all this apparatus of classification
and conceptualisation doesn't, in my opinion, alter the contingent
nature of the relationship. If one partner wants to go all your rights
might ensure some degree of compensation but that's it.

> Natural rights (as above defined) don't transcend any other rights. They
> are stipulated properties defined the same way. They are simply rights
> that attach to natural possessions. There is an important difference with
> those rights, though: we can usually claim them categorically. Common
> rights are always vulnerable to challenge -- if someone else claims your
> violin, we have to settle the dispute by determining which of you is
> actually the first possessor, or whose title chain can be traced to the
> first possessor. But natural rights are immune to such challenges.
> Someone else's claim to be the first possessor of your life would be
> implausible on its face.
Yes, it would be implausible - but that's because we have arrogated a
particular fiction. It may be a powerful fiction; it may possess
immense prestige (like many another fiction)...but it is still a
fiction.
>
> > Actually, your posting has helped me sharpen my original intent. I
> > said rights - meaning human rights generally - should be a moral
> > imperative. What I meant by that - but didn't say - is that we should
> > be committed to establishing and maintaining particular standards of
> > living for all human beings. This should be our moral purpose.
>
> There are two conceptions of rights at large these days. One of these is
> the natural rights tradition, which is usually attributed to Hobbes,
> Locke, and their successors. But this tradition is actually much older
> than that. It originates in English common law, and particularly the
> rules adopted by the Royal Courts for settling all kinds of civil
> disputes. By the time Hobbes and Locke wrote, the idea that individuals
> held rights was well-established. The US Bill of Rights and the French
> Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen canonize this tradition.
>
> The newer conception is the human rights tradition, probably best
> exemplified today by the UN Charter on Human Rights. In this tradition
> rights are construed as moral claims to various things thought to be
> necessary for life, or for a quality of life above some threshhold.
Well, I think that's my point, or nearly my point. They are moral
claims - but once realised they become thoughtless possessions. I
would like to keep that contingent consciousness,to see ourselves as
the fraught, talented creature that we are and to see the realisation
/ achievement of such standards on a global scale as a legitimate and
inspiring aspitation.

But we're not going to agree. Your's is the prevailing consciousness.
It is a fine consciousness - but it shunts all those within the fold
into a casual aceptance of what they have gained.

Best wishes

Joseph H
>
>

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	06 Dec 2004 22:45:03 GMT

joseph@humanisation.org (Joseph H) wrote in
news:2b0ce0c5.0412051239.133453e4@posting.google.com:

>> Rights are not natural properties, but stipulated properties. They
>> are socially defined properties, like being married and the others I
>> mentioned.

> But Bentham et al were not talking about stipulated properties. Nor am
> I. I - and they - were talking about a claim to something far grander.

Indeed they were -- they were (rightly) criticizing a concept of rights
that construed them as innate, natural properties of persons. But there
is no need to construe them that way, and such a construction is
inconsistent with the actual evolution of the concept in Anglo-American
thought.

The notion of a right as a property attaching to a person evolved in
English common law.

A bit of history. Soon after the Norman conquest, King William created
the Royal Courts. The aim was to bring a consistent, uniform rule of law
throughout the kingdom. The Royal judges "rode circuit," that is, they
travelled on a regular schedule to the seat of each county in the realm,
and heard cases brought to them by citizens, or by local sheriffs or
magistrates.

At the beginning, of course, there was no body of uniform law for the
Royal Courts to apply. So they began to invent it. Usually, if a certain
rule for deciding a particular type of dispute were accepted in a certain
district, the judges would adopt in that district, and if it seemed
superior (more workable, or fairer), than a different rule used
elsewhere, they would apply the first rule there as well. These courts
also kept meticulous records of their decisions (they were England's
first "courts of record"), and adopted the *stare decisis* rule -- that
like cases should be decided in a like way (they had been charged, after
all, with bringing a *uniform* rule of law to England).

One interesting fact about the Royal Courts -- they were voluntary, in
the sense that almost no one was required to use them. And there were at
the time various other courts having overlapping jurisdiction -- baronial
courts, duchal courts, ecclesiastical courts, and others. The King had
decreed that any case in which one party stood to lose a freehold (what
we would now call a "fee simple" land title), must be heard in the Royal
Courts. In any other type of case, the plaintiff could choose the court
to hear it.

But more and more frequently, disputants opted for the Royal Courts --
they had developed a reputation for impartiality, consistency, and
rational decision-making. They applied known rules that most people
thought fair, and thus their decisions became somewhat predictable. Those
rules, and the recorded decisions embodying them, became England's
"common law."

(Because the Royal Courts' decisions were recorded, they could be
studied, and some people acquired expertise in the courts' procedures and
practices. Thus the appearance of a new profession -- lawyers.)

The Royal Courts used the "writ system." At first, they limited their own
juridiction to only a few type of disputes, because they had neither the
expertise nor the manpower to take on all comers. For each of these
"causes" they developed a writ. A plaintiff would petition the court for
the appropriate writ, which the court would grant if the petitioner's
complaint seemed to fall within the scope of the writ. If granted, the
case was placed on the court's docket for hearing at its next session in
the plaintiff's county.

Over time more writs were added, and after a couple of centuries the
Royal Courts became courts of general jurisdiction. But the most widely
used, and most general, writ was the Writ of Right. In petitioning for a
Writ of Right, the plaintiff was asking the court to right a wrong. A
farmer would complain that a neighbor had appropriated some of his
cattle, or was trespassing upon his land. Most property disputes fell
under the scope of this Writ (and if yours didn't, you were out of luck,
at least with the Royal Courts ("No writ, no Right").

At some point the term "right" came to be used as though it were a
property of persons. To say you had a "right" meant that the courts would
rule in your favor under a Writ of Right (and eventually under other
writs). The basis of those "rights" were the rules the courts used for
deciding various kinds of disputes, which rules were widely thought fair
and just.

So the concept of a "right" often has been often mis-characterized,
usually by philosophers laboring under Platonic ontological assumptions
(which made no provision for relational properties like rights or
marriage).

I'm not sure properties of that kind are any less "grand," but they are
just as well-defined. Which is what counts, I think.

> Okay, I understand what you are saying. And I thank you for your very
> patient exposition. But I still hold to my original view (I told you:
> obtuse!).We would certainly wish to have the right(s) you mentioned;
> we would certainly wish to live in a society in which such a right /
> claim was protected; we would certainly wish to spend our time among
> people who respected our claim...but ultimately it is a claim, an
> assertion, a self-allocation, one that could easily be, and all too
> often IS easily, swept aside by hostile forces.

All you are saying here is the people may violate others' rights. Of
course they may. But does that render the concept useless? Does it
diminish the concept in any way? People can wrongly add a column of
figures, too -- does that render the concept of number useless? Would it
matter, for this problem, whether rights were natural properties or
stipulated, relational ones? Your life is a natural property you have,
but that can be swept aside as easily as a right.

> Well, I think that's my point, or nearly my point. They are moral
> claims - but once realised they become thoughtless possessions. I
> would like to keep that contingent consciousness,to see ourselves as
> the fraught, talented creature that we are and to see the realisation
> / achievement of such standards on a global scale as a legitimate and
> inspiring aspitation.

The notion that people have rights, and that there is a moral duty to
respect others' rights, does not imply that there are no other moral
duties. It does suggest that other moral duties asserted must not
conflict with rights (must not entail violations of rights). Otherwise
you have a moral theory that is internally inconsisent.

From:	ralph
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Thu, 2 Dec 2004 20:02:41 +0000

In message <2b0ce0c5.0412020926.6a181c76@posting.google.com>, Joseph H
writes
>Sorry..but my statement does not suggest this. My statement refers to
>something we call "inalienable rights".

We don't *call* them, Joseph, we *define* them.

> These, by definition, must be some natural property that we are deemed
>to possess - not an ability, or a skill, or a characteristic, or a
>computer (!) but an innate possession.

No, they're what we've given ourselves. Nothing innate about them.

> My point was that since human beings are made - literally - of the
>same stuff as all other creatures and are as much a product of the
>evolution and diversification of life as all other creatures then if we
>are deemed to possess such rights then so do all other creatures.

The same line of argument would give beetles trunks: it is false.

And you believe, Joseph, that the state of evolution at which humanity
finds itself separates it, in many important ways, from the rest of the
animal world. Don't you?
>>

--
ralph

From:	Joseph H
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	5 Dec 2004 12:01:53 -0800

ralph wrote in message news:...
> In message <2b0ce0c5.0412020926.6a181c76@posting.google.com>, Joseph H
> writes
> >Sorry..but my statement does not suggest this. My statement refers to
> >something we call "inalienable rights".
>
> We don't *call* them, Joseph, we *define* them.
We may well define them - but they are known generally - or
generically - as "inalienable rights"
>
> > These, by definition, must be some natural property that we are deemed
> >to possess - not an ability, or a skill, or a characteristic, or a
> >computer (!) but an innate possession.
>
> No, they're what we've given ourselves. Nothing innate about them.
Okay, so that clears it all up. We have given ourselves inalienable
rights. So that makes them inalienable? If we decide we are anything -
the "Chosen People", for example - does that in itself confer
legitimacy? I think not.
> > My point was that since human beings are made - literally - of the
> >same stuff as all other creatures and are as much a product of the
> >evolution and diversification of life as all other creatures then if we
> >are deemed to possess such rights then so do all other creatures.
>
> The same line of argument would give beetles trunks: it is false.
I don't see that. To say elephants have trunks - or whatever - is to
merely report on the obvious. To say that we possess inalienable
rights is to make a claim about a particular condition attaching to
our existence, that is the possession of a unique set of rights. Since
rights are not a physical or even a cerebral attribute and since - in
my view - our existence is fundamentally no different to any other on
the planet we can make no such claim unless we acknowledge that it
belongs to all creatures on the planet. Why, after all, should humans
possess such rights? Who confers them? Oh, ourselves! Well, wow-wee,
that really makes them real.
>
> And you believe, Joseph, that the state of evolution at which humanity
> finds itself separates it, in many important ways, from the rest of the
> animal world. Don't you?

I do. I don't see many gophers having conversations on the internet.
Do you? Seperation imples difference. It may imply superiority in some
areas - but not in all. It certainly does not imply perfection.

Joseph H

http://www.humanisation.org/
> >>

From:	none at none.net
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Mon, 29 Nov 2004 02:31:29 -0600

Rights do not exist in nature.
Rights are a artifact of human culture.

To speak of rights , as an abstract privilege inherent in human
nature is to give them a reality they don't possess.

Rights without recognition by others is meaningless.

From:	danti
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Mon, 29 Nov 2004 13:17:15 GMT

wrote in message
news:rhmlq0p3jp7olbr96fgrfj7objt7o9dtug@4ax.com...
> Rights do not exist in nature.
> Rights are a artifact of human culture.
>
>
> To speak of rights , as an abstract privilege inherent in human
> nature is to give them a reality they don't possess.
>
> Rights without recognition by others is meaningless.

how about rights by might? works in the jungles of africa and wall
street.....

From:	Anticorporation
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Tue, 30 Nov 2004 04:24:52 GMT

'RIGHTS' IS WHY WE MUST EXTERMINATE OTHER PEOPLE. Funny thing is, the
more people you kill the more rights you can possess.

wrote in message
news:rhmlq0p3jp7olbr96fgrfj7objt7o9dtug@4ax.com...
> Rights do not exist in nature.
> Rights are a artifact of human culture.
>
>
> To speak of rights , as an abstract privilege inherent in human
> nature is to give them a reality they don't possess.
>
> Rights without recognition by others is meaningless.

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	29 Nov 2004 08:56:03 GMT

none@none.net wrote in news:rhmlq0p3jp7olbr96fgrfj7objt7o9dtug@4ax.com:

> Rights do not exist in nature.
> Rights are a artifact of human culture.

Correct on both counts.

> To speak of rights , as an abstract privilege inherent in human
> nature is to give them a reality they don't possess.

The fact that rights are artifacts of culture does not entail that they are
not real. Neither do computers or impressionist paintings, nor square
roots.

From:	Zinnic
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	30 Nov 2004 11:08:44 -0800

Publius wrote in message news:...
> none@none.net wrote in news:rhmlq0p3jp7olbr96fgrfj7objt7o9dtug@4ax.com:
>
> > Rights do not exist in nature.
> > Rights are a artifact of human culture.
>
> Correct on both counts.
>
> > To speak of rights , as an abstract privilege inherent in human
> > nature is to give them a reality they don't possess.
>
> The fact that rights are artifacts of culture does not entail that they are
> not real. Neither do computers or impressionist paintings, nor square
> roots.

Rights and square roots are human concepts that do not exist in REAL
time. Computers and paintings, which exist in real time, are not
identical to their human concepts!
Regards ....Zinnic

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	30 Nov 2004 20:03:28 GMT

zeenric2@gate.net (Zinnic) wrote in
news:4ce617c0.0411301108.3483a6c@posting.google.com:

> Rights and square roots are human concepts that do not exist in REAL
> time. Computers and paintings, which exist in real time, are not
> identical to their human concepts!

His claim was that artifacts of human culture are not real, not that
concepts are not real.

You are right, of course. Concepts, and sometimes the things to which the
concepts refer (such as rights and square roots) are real enough, though
they don't have the same ontological status as physical objects. But the
concept is not the thing. That is, the concept of a computer is not the
computer, and the concept of a right is not the right.

From:	Zinnic
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	3 Dec 2004 12:32:23 -0800

Publius wrote in message news:...
> zeenric2@gate.net (Zinnic) wrote in
> news:4ce617c0.0411301108.3483a6c@posting.google.com:
>
> > Rights and square roots are human concepts that do not exist in REAL
> > time. Computers and paintings, which exist in real time, are not
> > identical to their human concepts!
>
> His claim was that artifacts of human culture are not real, not that
> concepts are not real.
>
> You are right, of course. Concepts, and sometimes the things to which the
> concepts refer (such as rights and square roots) are real enough, though
> they don't have the same ontological status as physical objects. But the
> concept is not the thing. That is, the concept of a computer is not the
> computer, and the concept of a right is not the right.

I suspect that you disagree with me! It is hard for me to accept that
concepts exist in real time. For example animals preying on each other
are not affected by the alleged reality of 'rights' and, as far as I
know, are equally impervious to the 'reality' of square roots.
Probably, we attach different meanings to 'real'.
REgards...Zinnic
Regards...Zinnic

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	03 Dec 2004 21:01:30 GMT

zeenric2@gate.net (Zinnic) wrote in
news:4ce617c0.0412031232.25234ee@posting.google.com:

> I suspect that you disagree with me! It is hard for me to accept that
> concepts exist in real time. For example animals preying on each other
> are not affected by the alleged reality of 'rights' and, as far as I
> know, are equally impervious to the 'reality' of square roots.
> Probably, we attach different meanings to 'real'.

Animals do not have rights (which is not to say they don't have a certain
moral status).

Methinks that if you want to reserve the term "real" only for physical
objects (those with coordinates in spacetime) you will find yourself living
in a very thinly populated world -- one without mathematics, theories,
imagination, joy, or love (among many other things).

Someone once wrote (Carnap, I think), "To be is to be the value of a well-
formed formula." That means that a thing is "real" if propositions
predicating the thing have clear truth conditions.

From:	Zinnic
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	4 Dec 2004 12:28:55 -0800

Publius wrote in message news:...
> zeenric2@gate.net (Zinnic) wrote in
> news:4ce617c0.0412031232.25234ee@posting.google.com:
>
> > I suspect that you disagree with me! It is hard for me to accept that
> > concepts exist in real time. For example animals preying on each other
> > are not affected by the alleged reality of 'rights' and, as far as I
> > know, are equally impervious to the 'reality' of square roots.
> > Probably, we attach different meanings to 'real'.
>
> Animals do not have rights (which is not to say they don't have a certain
> moral status).
>
> Methinks that if you want to reserve the term "real" only for physical
> objects (those with coordinates in spacetime) you will find yourself living
> in a very thinly populated world -- one without mathematics, theories,
> imagination, joy, or love (among many other things).

Not if one accepts that mathematics, theories, imagination, joy or
love are not real in themselves but are functions of real things! My
world is full of real things and their (almost?) infinite number of
functions.

> Someone once wrote (Carnap, I think), "To be is to be the value of a well-
> formed formula." That means that a thing is "real" if propositions
> predicating the thing have clear truth conditions.

For me 'things' require attributes that are independent of other
things. I may be getting out of my depth here but, setting aside the
essential interdependencece of everything in the Cosmos, the reality
of a tree does not depend on, for example, the reality of the planet
Mars. In contrast, running would not and could not exist without a
runner. Similarly, mathematics, theories, joy etc are totally
dependent on the reality of a thinker.
Essentially my position is that the real existence of a tree does not
require a perceiver, whereas the existence of a concept without a
conceiver is unreal.
Regards... Zinnic

From:	Publius
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	04 Dec 2004 23:43:10 GMT

zeenric2@gate.net (Zinnic) wrote in
news:4ce617c0.0412041228.2338c562@posting.google.com:

>> Methinks that if you want to reserve the term "real" only for
>> physical objects (those with coordinates in spacetime) you will find
>> yourself living in a very thinly populated world -- one without
>> mathematics, theories, imagination, joy, or love (among many other
>> things).
>
>
> Not if one accepts that mathematics, theories, imagination, joy or
> love are not real in themselves but are functions of real things! My
> world is full of real things and their (almost?) infinite number of
> functions.

This dispute seems to be mainly verbal. You want to reserve the term
"real" for objects with spacetime coordinates, and characterize any things
that don't meet that criterion as functions of real things (or perhaps as
non-existent). That may be a workable approach (one that could be made
consistent), but it would be cumbersome, and at odds with customary usages
of the term. For example, you couldn't distinguish between, say, a real
contract and a fictitious contract -- a task courts are often called upon
to do (because for you, presumably, no contracts, especially verbal ones,
are real). Also, how would you preserve the distinction between a real
theory and a pseudo-theory? Or real love and puppy love? Or real numbers
and irrational numbers? Or a real motive and an apparent motive? Those are
all common usages of "real" that are, generally, unambiguous and well-
understood. And what of your functions themselves? Are they real? Could
there be some real functions and some that were not real?

Most philosophers have given a broader scope to the term "real" than you
apparently prefer to do. They simply recognize that there are different
ontological categories of things. A thing is "real" if it satisfies the
truth conditions applicable to things in that category, "unreal" if it
doesn't. Thus, the test for a real contract is different than the test for
a real tree, but both tests work within their own domains. The main risk
with having multiple ontological categories is mis-categorizing things --
thinking about things that belong in one category as though they were
members of another (what Gilbert Ryle called a "category mistake.") Your
approach would avoid those problems, but, I think, has problems of its own.

From:	Zinnic
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	6 Dec 2004 00:37:33 -0800

Publius wrote in message news:...
> zeenric2@gate.net (Zinnic) wrote in
> news:4ce617c0.0412041228.2338c562@posting.google.com:
>
> >> Methinks that if you want to reserve the term "real" only for
> >> physical objects (those with coordinates in spacetime) you will find
> >> yourself living in a very thinly populated world -- one without
> >> mathematics, theories, imagination, joy, or love (among many other
> >> things).
> >
> >
> > Not if one accepts that mathematics, theories, imagination, joy or
> > love are not real in themselves but are functions of real things! My
> > world is full of real things and their (almost?) infinite number of
> > functions.
>
> This dispute seems to be mainly verbal. You want to reserve the term
> "real" for objects with spacetime coordinates, and characterize any things
> that don't meet that criterion as functions of real things (or perhaps as
> non-existent). That may be a workable approach (one that could be made
> consistent), but it would be cumbersome, and at odds with customary usages
> of the term. For example, you couldn't distinguish between, say, a real
> contract and a fictitious contract -- a task courts are often called upon
> to do (because for you, presumably, no contracts, especially verbal ones,
> are real). Also, how would you preserve the distinction between a real
> theory and a pseudo-theory? Or real love and puppy love? Or real numbers
> and irrational numbers? Or a real motive and an apparent motive? Those are
> all common usages of "real" that are, generally, unambiguous and well-
> understood. And what of your functions themselves? Are they real? Could
> there be some real functions and some that were not real?
>
> Most philosophers have given a broader scope to the term "real" than you
> apparently prefer to do. They simply recognize that there are different
> ontological categories of things. A thing is "real" if it satisfies the
> truth conditions applicable to things in that category, "unreal" if it
> doesn't. Thus, the test for a real contract is different than the test for
> a real tree, but both tests work within their own domains. The main risk
> with having multiple ontological categories is mis-categorizing things --
> thinking about things that belong in one category as though they were
> members of another (what Gilbert Ryle called a "category mistake.") Your
> approach would avoid those problems, but, I think, has problems of its own.

I agree that it is semantics. I find it as a serious problem in
philosophical discussion. After a career in science, I arrogantly
believed that I could be a player in philosophy without a formal
education in the field. I stand corrected!
However, I am dismayed by the untrammelled use of ambiguous words in
philosophical discussion. Insistence on specificity may be cumbersome
but is essential to invalidate the nonsensical conclusions that arise
from 'customary usage' of terms.
For example, what is a fictitious contract? Is it a contract
described in a novel or is it an invalid contract? It may have a
specific meaning to lawyers but it is ambiguous for non-lawyers. I can
distinguish between a valid (real?) and a non-valid contract but a
real versus an 'unreal' (invalid ?) contract leaves me confused.

What is a real theory as opposed to a pseudo theory? Is a pseudo
theory one that is incorrect or one that someone has advanced knowing
it was incorrect. As a scientist, my understanding is that a theory
(correct or incorrect) is advanced in good faith with the open
challenge to prove it incorrect.
One distiguishes between degrees of love, types of numbers or motives
by the use of adjectives (as you used in your post). However,
describing a love or a motive as 'real' rather than true, prostitutes
the 'real' meaning of real.

Functions are not real in the sense that entities are real. Functions
do not exist, they occur. Functions that do not occur are in the same
category as entities that do not exist.

Pardon my naivety, but I do not accept that truth is synonymous with
reality. A true concept (real?) is no more an entity than is a false
concept (unreal?), though both may be functions of someones brain.
There are 'things' and there are 'occurences' (concepts etc). I'll
take the easy conclusion. Things have substance, 'things' that happen
to them do not!
Ergo - things are the REAL things.
Regards.... Zinnic.

From:	Marvin Edwards
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Sun, 28 Nov 2004 12:38:40 GMT

"Joseph H" wrote in message
news:2b0ce0c5.0411280342.3e1a73d1@posting.google.com...

> If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature ... <

On the one hand, no turkey.

> ... We ought to value our own creation of our own rights. <

On the other hand, there is Thanksgiving.

> Our obvious need - and wish - for a moral component in our lives ought to
> be satisfied by this creation. ... <

The "moral" component is more than rights. A gift given in love to the
undeserving is not a right, yet it is morality.

> ... Our communal rights have been whisked away and become a mere
> individual possession to be added to ON DEMAND! This was only to expected.
> Freedom, after all, is an intoxicant and we should expect some
> intoxication. But the result is a diminuition and a devaluation of our
> achievements which in turn leads to alienation and an indifference which
> can damage the well-springs of our societies. <

Not sure I understand you, but the moral values of our communities do appear
to be degraded by immoral music lyrics and video games. But maybe you had
different examples in mind.

> Humanisation seeks to impart such a valuation. <

Humanism, which pursues morality and justice directly, as if they were
"gods" but without the "god" construct, constantly challenges us to find the
best morality and the best justice.

From:	Joseph H
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	29 Nov 2004 10:38:24 -0800

"Marvin Edwards" wrote in message news:...
> "Joseph H" wrote in message
> news:2b0ce0c5.0411280342.3e1a73d1@posting.google.com...
>
> > If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature ... <
>
> On the one hand, no turkey.
>
> > ... We ought to value our own creation of our own rights. <
>
> On the other hand, there is Thanksgiving.

I would suggest that the men and women who originally conceived of
Thanksgiving had rather more a sense of the meaning of the feast than
we have today.
>
> > Our obvious need - and wish - for a moral component in our lives ought to
> > be satisfied by this creation. ... <
>
> The "moral" component is more than rights. A gift given in love to the
> undeserving is not a right, yet it is morality.
Okay. "Moral" might not be the best word there. I believe that we
value value, that we long to be part of something, that we long for
meaning, that we wish the happiness of others (generally) and are
distressed by the suffering of others. What I was trying to say is
that this element in our nature, so often satisfied by religion, would
be equally satisfied by a sense that we were part of a society which
insisted on the worth of human life.
>
> > ... Our communal rights have been whisked away and become a mere
> > individual possession to be added to ON DEMAND! This was only to expected.
> > Freedom, after all, is an intoxicant and we should expect some
> > intoxication. But the result is a diminuition and a devaluation of our
> > achievements which in turn leads to alienation and an indifference which
> > can damage the well-springs of our societies. <
>
> Not sure I understand you, but the moral values of our communities do appear
> to be degraded by immoral music lyrics and video games. But maybe you had
> different examples in mind.
....No, the above, plus a narrow materialism, plus no real sense of the
wonder and compexity of existence.
>
> > Humanisation seeks to impart such a valuation. <
>
> Humanism, which pursues morality and justice directly, as if they were
> "gods" but without the "god" construct, constantly challenges us to find the
> best morality and the best justice.

From:	Marvin Edwards
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Tue, 30 Nov 2004 00:04:08 GMT

"Joseph H" wrote in message
news:2b0ce0c5.0411291038.32d3297f@posting.google.com...

> Okay. "Moral" might not be the best word there. I believe that we value
> value, that we long to be part of something, that we long for meaning,
> that we wish the happiness of others (generally) and are distressed by the
> suffering of others. What I was trying to say is that this element in our
> nature, so often satisfied by religion, would be equally satisfied by a
> sense that we were part of a society which insisted on the worth of human
> life. <

Amen.

From:	David V.
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Mon, 29 Nov 2004 10:45:34 -0800

Joseph H wrote:
> "Marvin Edwards" wrote
>
>> "Joseph H" wrote
>>
>>> If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature
>>> in nature ...
>>
>> On the one hand, no turkey.
>>
>>> ... We ought to value our own creation of our own rights.
>>
>> On the other hand, there is Thanksgiving.
>
> I would suggest that the men and women who originally
> conceived of Thanksgiving had rather more a sense of the
> meaning of the feast than we have today.

It was simply a harvest festival, a celebration of the hard work
done to put away food for the long winter. Then the theists
prostituted the celebration and stuck their gods in it.
--
Dave
UDP for WebTV

From:	Anticorporation
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Tue, 30 Nov 2004 04:20:21 GMT

FUCKING THEISTS

"David V." wrote in message
news:bcGdnepE4fbT8zbcRVn-og@sti.net...
> Joseph H wrote:
>> "Marvin Edwards" wrote
>>
>>> "Joseph H" wrote
>>>
>>>> If we have inalienable rights so has every other creature in nature ...
>>>
>>> On the one hand, no turkey.
>>>
>>>> ... We ought to value our own creation of our own rights.
>>>
>>> On the other hand, there is Thanksgiving.
>>
>> I would suggest that the men and women who originally conceived of
>> Thanksgiving had rather more a sense of the meaning of the feast than we
>> have today.
>
> It was simply a harvest festival, a celebration of the hard work
> done to put away food for the long winter. Then the theists
> prostituted the celebration and stuck their gods in it.
> --
> Dave
> UDP for WebTV

From:	David V.
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Mon, 29 Nov 2004 22:04:56 -0800

Anticorporation wrote:
>
> "David V." wrote
>
>> Joseph H wrote:
>>
>>> "Marvin Edwards" wrote
>>>
>>>> "Joseph H" wrote
>>>>
>>>>> If we have inalienable rights so has every other
>>>>> creature in nature ...
>>>>
>>>> On the one hand, no turkey.
>>>>
>>>>> ... We ought to value our own creation of our own
>>>>> rights.
>>>>
>>>> On the other hand, there is Thanksgiving.
>>>
>>> I would suggest that the men and women who originally
>>> conceived of Thanksgiving had rather more a sense of the
>>> meaning of the feast than we have today.
>>
>> It was simply a harvest festival, a celebration of the hard
>> work done to put away food for the long winter. Then the
>> theists prostituted the celebration and stuck their gods in
>> it.
>
> FUCKING THEISTS

Yes, they're almost as bad as top posters.
--
Dave
UDP for WebTV

From:	Anticorporation
Subject:	Re: RIGHTS OUGHT TO BE A MORAL IMPERATIVE - NOT A RIGHT
Date:	Tue, 30 Nov 2004 06:22:24 GMT

What's a fucking 'top poster'?

"David V." wrote in message
news:JpCdnaK194QUkDHcRVn-rA@sti.net...
> Anticorporation wrote:
>>
>> "David V." wrote
>>
>>> Joseph H wrote:
>>>
>>>> "Marvin Edwards" wrote
>>>>
>>>>> "Joseph H" wrote
>>>>>
>>>>>> If we have inalienable rights so has every other
>>>>>> creature in nature ...
>>>>>
>>>>> On the one hand, no turkey.
>>>>>
>>>>>> ... We ought to value our own creation of our own
>>>>>> rights.
>>>>>
>>>>> On the other hand, there is Thanksgiving.
>>>>
>>>> I would suggest that the men and women who originally
>>>> conceived of Thanksgiving had rather more a sense of the
>>>> meaning of the feast than we have today.
>>>
>>> It was simply a harvest festival, a celebration of the hard
>>> work done to put away food for the long winter. Then the
>>> theists prostituted the celebration and stuck their gods in
>>> it.
>>
>> FUCKING THEISTS
>
> Yes, they're almost as bad as top posters.
> --
> Dave
> UDP for WebTV