From:

http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/key-features-of-identity-cards-bill.html

[For links goto web version at above URL]

``The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage
through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As
spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned
sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184
amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive
adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down
to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.

I shall summarise some of the key features of the bill here.
The National Identity Register(NIR)
Section 1 sets up the NIR, and together with Schedule 1 determines
what information will be stored on it. The information to be stored
includes:

* a unique National Idenity Registration Number(NIRN) for each
person in the NIR.
* your date of birth, gender, full name and any other name you've
had.
* your current address plus every address you've ever lived at.
* your photo, signature and biometric scans.
* your residential status plus every previous residential status
you've had.
* details of any official identity documents issued to you,
* the history of all changes made to your NIR record,
* details of all ID cards issued to you, their validity, whether
you've been ordered to surrender them, etc.
* details of all the information you've provided to register on
the NIR and to apply for/renew your ID cards.
* details of every occasion on which the NIR entry has been
accessed by others. Note that when it becomes necessary to have your
ID card and NIR entry checked in order to access public services, this
item will thus record your usage of those services, e.g. what medical
services you've signed up for.

Access to the information on the NIR
Note that where the Home Secretary gets powers to issue orders, the
orders must be approved by both Houses of Parliament, unless otherwise
stated.

Section 14 allows the Home Secretary to disclose some of the
information on your NIR entry to you, or to someone else acting on
your behalf, for purposes of verification of the data if you apply to
for such access. The information you can get includes:

* your name, date of birth, addresses and gender.
* your identifying numbers and the validity of your identifying
documents.
* your photo and signature.
* whether biometric scans taken from you matched the ones recorded
for you.

The information you can access under this section does NOT include the
record of changes to your NIR entry or the record of who has accessed
your NIR entry. However, section 14(8) does permit access to the NIR
record using other legislation such as the Data Protection Act. It is
thus not clear whether an individual can get access to the record of
who has accessed their NIR entiry.

Section 17 gives the Home Secretary the power to allow a person
providing a public service to access the NIR to verify your identity,
where the person is also authorised to check your ID card before
providing the service (see also Section 15 and 16).

Section 19 sets out which public authorities can access NIR
information without your consent (see also Section 20):

* MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (see the
Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill) will get access to all of the
information for the purposes of carrying out their functions.
* The Police, Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, will get
access to all the information, except the record of who has accessed
the NIR, in the interests of national security, for preventing or
detecting crime and for other purposes specified by order of the Home
Secretary. In the case of the IR and C&E they also get access for
carrying out their functions and investigating conduct that might
incur the penalties they can enforce.
* Government departments get access to all the information, except
the record of who has accessed the NIR, where the Home Secretary
prescribes it for the exercising/carrying out of any powers or duties
the deparment has by virtue of the Bill or for the
issuing/modification of official documents.

Section 22 gives the Home Secretary the power to disclose specified
information to a specified individual for specified purposes, by
order.

The obligations the bill imposes
Section 6 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel individuals
matching a specified description to register on the NIR and get a card
by order. Failure to comply incurs a civil penalty of upto £2500.

Section 11 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel any person, by
order, to provide information for the purposes of verifying
information recorded, or due to be recorded, in the NIR, if he
believes the individual has that information in their possession.

Section 12 requires ID card holders to notify the Home Secretary of
any changes of circumstances that affect their information on the NIR
and any error they become aware of in their NIR entry. The card
holders may be ordered to attend a specific place at a specific time
and have biometric scans taken and to provide any information required
by the Home Secretary. Failure to comply can result in a civil penalty
of upto £1,000 pounds.

Section 13 requires people to notify the Home Secretary if their card
is lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed. The Home
Secretary can cancel a card if it appears to him to be lost, stolen,
damaged, destroyed, tampered with, issued on the basis of incorrect or
incomplete info, the NIR entry has been modified, a change of
circumstances requires modification of the card or the card needs to
be reissued.

A person in possession of someone else's card must surrender it as
soon as practical. The Home Secretary can require the surrender of a
card if it is possessed by someone other than the card holder, or the
card has been cancelled, expired or is otherwise invalid or if the
card is to be reissued or if was acquired invalidly.

Damage is taken to include the card or anything on it having become
unreadable or unusable for any reason -- i.e. if the govt's card
reader damages your card, YOU are obliged to report the fact.

Failure to surrender a card when ordered, or to notify the Home
Secretary of the loss, damage, tampering with, destruction of or
stealing of your card is an offence punishable by upto 51 weeks in
prison.

Section 15 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
providing public services to require checking of the ID card before
allowing access to those services.

Section 17 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
providing public services to access information on the NIR to verify a
cardholder's identity.

Sections 27 to 31 make offences of:

* possessing either false ID documents or the equipment for making
false documents, with the intention of using the documents for
enrolment, on pain of upto 10 years imprisonment.
* possessing either false ID documents or equipment for making
them without a reasonable excuse on pain of imprisonment for upto 5
years.
* disclosing confidential NIR information without authorisation on
pain of upto 2 years imprisonment or a fine or both,
* providing false information to be included on the NIR or in
order to modify information on the NIR. The offence carries upto 2
years in prison, or a fine or both.
* tampering with the NIR, including any conduct making it more
difficult or impossible for the NIR information to be retrieved (e.g.
NIR operators going on strike?! The same operators making a mistake
that causes a crash?!). The offence carries upto 10 years in prison,
or a fine or both. See spy.org.uk's comments on this clause.''

James

From:	Wolseley 6-80
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sat, 22 Jan 2005 23:29:44 -0000

From:	Graham Murray
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 22:51:47 +0000

"Robert Peffers" writes:

> That is the danger. How can any government keep such data free from access
> by those who would misuse it. Not least of these is the very government
> itself?

And it brings closer the possibility of events like those in the movie
"The Net" (where Sandra Bullock has her identity wiped then changed)
might actually happen.

From:	abelard
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 19:11:03 +0100

On Sat, 22 Jan 2005 20:56:09 +0000, James Hammerton

typed:

>From:
>
>http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/key-features-of-identity-cards-bill.html
>
>[For links goto web version at above URL]
>
>``The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage
>through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As
>spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned
>sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184
>amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive
>adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down
>to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.

surely it would be better to implant a readable chip....preferably
near the heart by a specialised surgeon in order to stop fraudulent
implantation....

regards....

--
web site at www.abelard.org - news and comment service, logic,
energy, education, politics, etc 1,092,815 document calls in year past
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
all that is necessary for [] walk quietly and carry
the triumph of evil is that [] a big stick.
good people do nothing [] trust actions not words
only when it's funny -- roger rabbit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From:	Robert Peffers
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 22:01:45 -0000

"abelard" wrote in message
news:p2q7v09g5ovpsneb2kaf0o8tao9vm3umg3@4ax.com...
> On Sat, 22 Jan 2005 20:56:09 +0000, James Hammerton
>
>
> typed:
>
>>From:
>>
>>http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/key-features-of-identity-cards-bill.html
>>
>>[For links goto web version at above URL]
>>
>>``The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage
>>through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As
>>spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned
>>sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184
>>amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive
>>adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down
>>to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.
>
> surely it would be better to implant a readable chip....preferably
> near the heart by a specialised surgeon in order to stop fraudulent
> implantation....
>
> regards....
>
> --
> web site at www.abelard.org - news and comment service, logic,
> energy, education, politics, etc 1,092,815 document calls in year past
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> all that is necessary for [] walk quietly and carry
> the triumph of evil is that [] a big stick.
> good people do nothing [] trust actions not words
> only when it's funny -- roger rabbit
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frae Auld Bob Peffers:
Don't you get it yet?
The problem can only be solved by having something, or combination of
things, that cannot be faked by anyone. This/these can only be what does
actually make us, "us". This has to be something that is very individual and
not copyable. That means it has to be part of each of us. Logic dictates
that the cards have to be verifiable. So signature, DNA, Fingerprint, blood
group and the cornea scan of the eye are the kind of things that have to be
included. The problem is not with these for the technology is with us right
now. The problem is that if we have these cards with such data on them they
are not much real use except to say who we are and there is little
difficulty doing that for an alive and kicking person for the police can
stop and detain anyone in the UK as it is. given a little time they can soon
identify anyone or at least have them prove they are who they say they are.

The cards are worthless to the authorities unless they carry with them data
about the person who carries the card. They already have data bases about
your medical history, your vehicle and driving history, the data on your
passport, your tax history, your National Insurance history, your social
work history and via the tax and excise people, your job(s), income and
spending. Until now it has been illegal for one government department to
pass information to another department and also illegal for banks and other
financial groups to give information to anyone, The law that came in this
year allows the government access to all these and they will have no trouble
putting it all together and registering on the identity card. They do not
need to do so, though, for by knowing positively who anyone is anyone with
access to their database can find the facts in seconds.

That is the danger. How can any government keep such data free from access
by those who would misuse it. Not least of these is the very government
itself?
--

Aefauldlie, (Scots word for Honestly),
Robert, (Auld Bob), Peffers,
Kelty,
Fife,
Scotland, (UK).
Web Site, "The Eck's Files":- http://www.peffers50.freeserve.co.uk

From:	James Hammerton
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 20:26:01 +0000

On Sun, 23 Jan 2005 19:11:03 +0100, abelard
wrote:

>On Sat, 22 Jan 2005 20:56:09 +0000, James Hammerton
>
>
> typed:
>
>>From:
>>
>>http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/key-features-of-identity-cards-bill.html
>>
>>[For links goto web version at above URL]
>>
>>``The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage
>>through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As
>>spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned
>>sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184
>>amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive
>>adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down
>>to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.
>
>surely it would be better to implant a readable chip....preferably
> near the heart by a specialised surgeon in order to stop fraudulent
> implantation....

Chip implants are already being sold as a convenient means for getting
the rounds in at your favourite nightclub:

http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/glasgow-night-club-chips-its-sheep.html

Admittedly they're not being implanted near the heart yet...

James

From:	Dave
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 08:11:45 +0000 (UTC)

"James Hammerton" wrote in message
news:saf5v05kjuinp217pf9bk9pbkfho3epph8@4ax.com...
> From:
>
> http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/key-features-of-identity-cards-bill.html
>
> [For links goto web version at above URL]
>
> ``The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage
> through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As
> spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned
> sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184
> amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive
> adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down
> to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.
>
> I shall summarise some of the key features of the bill here.
> The National Identity Register(NIR)
> Section 1 sets up the NIR, and together with Schedule 1 determines
> what information will be stored on it. The information to be stored
> includes:
>
> * a unique National Idenity Registration Number(NIRN) for each
> person in the NIR.
> * your date of birth, gender, full name and any other name you've
> had.
> * your current address plus every address you've ever lived at.
> * your photo, signature and biometric scans.
> * your residential status plus every previous residential status
> you've had.
> * details of any official identity documents issued to you,
> * the history of all changes made to your NIR record,
> * details of all ID cards issued to you, their validity, whether
> you've been ordered to surrender them, etc.
> * details of all the information you've provided to register on
> the NIR and to apply for/renew your ID cards.
> * details of every occasion on which the NIR entry has been
> accessed by others. Note that when it becomes necessary to have your
> ID card and NIR entry checked in order to access public services, this
> item will thus record your usage of those services, e.g. what medical
> services you've signed up for.
>
> Access to the information on the NIR
> Note that where the Home Secretary gets powers to issue orders, the
> orders must be approved by both Houses of Parliament, unless otherwise
> stated.
>
> Section 14 allows the Home Secretary to disclose some of the
> information on your NIR entry to you, or to someone else acting on
> your behalf, for purposes of verification of the data if you apply to
> for such access. The information you can get includes:
>
> * your name, date of birth, addresses and gender.
> * your identifying numbers and the validity of your identifying
> documents.
> * your photo and signature.
> * whether biometric scans taken from you matched the ones recorded
> for you.
>
> The information you can access under this section does NOT include the
> record of changes to your NIR entry or the record of who has accessed
> your NIR entry. However, section 14(8) does permit access to the NIR
> record using other legislation such as the Data Protection Act. It is
> thus not clear whether an individual can get access to the record of
> who has accessed their NIR entiry.
>
> Section 17 gives the Home Secretary the power to allow a person
> providing a public service to access the NIR to verify your identity,
> where the person is also authorised to check your ID card before
> providing the service (see also Section 15 and 16).
>
> Section 19 sets out which public authorities can access NIR
> information without your consent (see also Section 20):
>
> * MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (see the
> Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill) will get access to all of the
> information for the purposes of carrying out their functions.
> * The Police, Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, will get
> access to all the information, except the record of who has accessed
> the NIR, in the interests of national security, for preventing or
> detecting crime and for other purposes specified by order of the Home
> Secretary. In the case of the IR and C&E they also get access for
> carrying out their functions and investigating conduct that might
> incur the penalties they can enforce.
> * Government departments get access to all the information, except
> the record of who has accessed the NIR, where the Home Secretary
> prescribes it for the exercising/carrying out of any powers or duties
> the deparment has by virtue of the Bill or for the
> issuing/modification of official documents.
>
> Section 22 gives the Home Secretary the power to disclose specified
> information to a specified individual for specified purposes, by
> order.
>
> The obligations the bill imposes
> Section 6 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel individuals
> matching a specified description to register on the NIR and get a card
> by order. Failure to comply incurs a civil penalty of upto £2500.
>
> Section 11 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel any person, by
> order, to provide information for the purposes of verifying
> information recorded, or due to be recorded, in the NIR, if he
> believes the individual has that information in their possession.
>
> Section 12 requires ID card holders to notify the Home Secretary of
> any changes of circumstances that affect their information on the NIR
> and any error they become aware of in their NIR entry. The card
> holders may be ordered to attend a specific place at a specific time
> and have biometric scans taken and to provide any information required
> by the Home Secretary. Failure to comply can result in a civil penalty
> of upto £1,000 pounds.
>
> Section 13 requires people to notify the Home Secretary if their card
> is lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed. The Home
> Secretary can cancel a card if it appears to him to be lost, stolen,
> damaged, destroyed, tampered with, issued on the basis of incorrect or
> incomplete info, the NIR entry has been modified, a change of
> circumstances requires modification of the card or the card needs to
> be reissued.
>
> A person in possession of someone else's card must surrender it as
> soon as practical. The Home Secretary can require the surrender of a
> card if it is possessed by someone other than the card holder, or the
> card has been cancelled, expired or is otherwise invalid or if the
> card is to be reissued or if was acquired invalidly.
>
> Damage is taken to include the card or anything on it having become
> unreadable or unusable for any reason -- i.e. if the govt's card
> reader damages your card, YOU are obliged to report the fact.
>
> Failure to surrender a card when ordered, or to notify the Home
> Secretary of the loss, damage, tampering with, destruction of or
> stealing of your card is an offence punishable by upto 51 weeks in
> prison.
>
> Section 15 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
> providing public services to require checking of the ID card before
> allowing access to those services.
>
> Section 17 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
> providing public services to access information on the NIR to verify a
> cardholder's identity.
>
> Sections 27 to 31 make offences of:
>
> * possessing either false ID documents or the equipment for making
> false documents, with the intention of using the documents for
> enrolment, on pain of upto 10 years imprisonment.
> * possessing either false ID documents or equipment for making
> them without a reasonable excuse on pain of imprisonment for upto 5
> years.
> * disclosing confidential NIR information without authorisation on
> pain of upto 2 years imprisonment or a fine or both,
> * providing false information to be included on the NIR or in
> order to modify information on the NIR. The offence carries upto 2
> years in prison, or a fine or both.
> * tampering with the NIR, including any conduct making it more
> difficult or impossible for the NIR information to be retrieved (e.g.
> NIR operators going on strike?! The same operators making a mistake
> that causes a crash?!). The offence carries upto 10 years in prison,
> or a fine or both. See spy.org.uk's comments on this clause.''
>
> James
>

If you are a law abiding citizen and not planning to join an Al Queda cell
what is the problem?
It's a piece of plastic with a smart chip which confirms your identity,
whoopy doo.
With all the dodgy illegal immigrants wandering around the country I would
carry a Identity Card with pride.

Dave

From:	Jonathan Bryce
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 10:00:36 +0000

Dave wrote:

> If you are a law abiding citizen and not planning to join an Al Queda cell
> what is the problem?
> It's a piece of plastic with a smart chip which confirms your identity,
> whoopy doo.

which members of Al Quaeda can get just like everyone else.

It is also another money making opportunity for criminals.

From:	Steve Barlow
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 13:42:54 +0000

On Sun, 23 Jan 2005 08:11:45 +0000 (UTC), "Dave" wrote:

>
>If you are a law abiding citizen and not planning to join an Al Queda cell
>what is the problem?
>It's a piece of plastic with a smart chip which confirms your identity,
>whoopy doo.
>With all the dodgy illegal immigrants wandering around the country I would
>carry a Identity Card with pride.
>
>Dave
>
If you had the common sense to snip the 160 lines of redundant post,
perhaps you could work it out.

Or maybe not.

--
Steve Barlow

From:	Jackie Mulheron
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 13:47:27 -0000

"Dave" wrote in message
news:csvm81$b3r$1@hercules.btinternet.com...
>
> "James Hammerton" wrote in message
> news:saf5v05kjuinp217pf9bk9pbkfho3epph8@4ax.com...
>> From:
>>
>> http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/key-features-of-identity-cards-bill.html
>>
>> [For links goto web version at above URL]
>>
>> ``The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage
>> through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As
>> spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned
>> sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184
>> amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive
>> adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down
>> to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.
>>
>> I shall summarise some of the key features of the bill here.
>> The National Identity Register(NIR)
>> Section 1 sets up the NIR, and together with Schedule 1 determines
>> what information will be stored on it. The information to be stored
>> includes:
>>
>> * a unique National Idenity Registration Number(NIRN) for each
>> person in the NIR.
>> * your date of birth, gender, full name and any other name you've
>> had.
>> * your current address plus every address you've ever lived at.
>> * your photo, signature and biometric scans.
>> * your residential status plus every previous residential status
>> you've had.
>> * details of any official identity documents issued to you,
>> * the history of all changes made to your NIR record,
>> * details of all ID cards issued to you, their validity, whether
>> you've been ordered to surrender them, etc.
>> * details of all the information you've provided to register on
>> the NIR and to apply for/renew your ID cards.
>> * details of every occasion on which the NIR entry has been
>> accessed by others. Note that when it becomes necessary to have your
>> ID card and NIR entry checked in order to access public services, this
>> item will thus record your usage of those services, e.g. what medical
>> services you've signed up for.
>>
>> Access to the information on the NIR
>> Note that where the Home Secretary gets powers to issue orders, the
>> orders must be approved by both Houses of Parliament, unless otherwise
>> stated.
>>
>> Section 14 allows the Home Secretary to disclose some of the
>> information on your NIR entry to you, or to someone else acting on
>> your behalf, for purposes of verification of the data if you apply to
>> for such access. The information you can get includes:
>>
>> * your name, date of birth, addresses and gender.
>> * your identifying numbers and the validity of your identifying
>> documents.
>> * your photo and signature.
>> * whether biometric scans taken from you matched the ones recorded
>> for you.
>>
>> The information you can access under this section does NOT include the
>> record of changes to your NIR entry or the record of who has accessed
>> your NIR entry. However, section 14(8) does permit access to the NIR
>> record using other legislation such as the Data Protection Act. It is
>> thus not clear whether an individual can get access to the record of
>> who has accessed their NIR entiry.
>>
>> Section 17 gives the Home Secretary the power to allow a person
>> providing a public service to access the NIR to verify your identity,
>> where the person is also authorised to check your ID card before
>> providing the service (see also Section 15 and 16).
>>
>> Section 19 sets out which public authorities can access NIR
>> information without your consent (see also Section 20):
>>
>> * MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (see the
>> Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill) will get access to all of the
>> information for the purposes of carrying out their functions.
>> * The Police, Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, will get
>> access to all the information, except the record of who has accessed
>> the NIR, in the interests of national security, for preventing or
>> detecting crime and for other purposes specified by order of the Home
>> Secretary. In the case of the IR and C&E they also get access for
>> carrying out their functions and investigating conduct that might
>> incur the penalties they can enforce.
>> * Government departments get access to all the information, except
>> the record of who has accessed the NIR, where the Home Secretary
>> prescribes it for the exercising/carrying out of any powers or duties
>> the deparment has by virtue of the Bill or for the
>> issuing/modification of official documents.
>>
>> Section 22 gives the Home Secretary the power to disclose specified
>> information to a specified individual for specified purposes, by
>> order.
>>
>> The obligations the bill imposes
>> Section 6 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel individuals
>> matching a specified description to register on the NIR and get a card
>> by order. Failure to comply incurs a civil penalty of upto £2500.
>>
>> Section 11 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel any person, by
>> order, to provide information for the purposes of verifying
>> information recorded, or due to be recorded, in the NIR, if he
>> believes the individual has that information in their possession.
>>
>> Section 12 requires ID card holders to notify the Home Secretary of
>> any changes of circumstances that affect their information on the NIR
>> and any error they become aware of in their NIR entry. The card
>> holders may be ordered to attend a specific place at a specific time
>> and have biometric scans taken and to provide any information required
>> by the Home Secretary. Failure to comply can result in a civil penalty
>> of upto £1,000 pounds.
>>
>> Section 13 requires people to notify the Home Secretary if their card
>> is lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed. The Home
>> Secretary can cancel a card if it appears to him to be lost, stolen,
>> damaged, destroyed, tampered with, issued on the basis of incorrect or
>> incomplete info, the NIR entry has been modified, a change of
>> circumstances requires modification of the card or the card needs to
>> be reissued.
>>
>> A person in possession of someone else's card must surrender it as
>> soon as practical. The Home Secretary can require the surrender of a
>> card if it is possessed by someone other than the card holder, or the
>> card has been cancelled, expired or is otherwise invalid or if the
>> card is to be reissued or if was acquired invalidly.
>>
>> Damage is taken to include the card or anything on it having become
>> unreadable or unusable for any reason -- i.e. if the govt's card
>> reader damages your card, YOU are obliged to report the fact.
>>
>> Failure to surrender a card when ordered, or to notify the Home
>> Secretary of the loss, damage, tampering with, destruction of or
>> stealing of your card is an offence punishable by upto 51 weeks in
>> prison.
>>
>> Section 15 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
>> providing public services to require checking of the ID card before
>> allowing access to those services.
>>
>> Section 17 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
>> providing public services to access information on the NIR to verify a
>> cardholder's identity.
>>
>> Sections 27 to 31 make offences of:
>>
>> * possessing either false ID documents or the equipment for making
>> false documents, with the intention of using the documents for
>> enrolment, on pain of upto 10 years imprisonment.
>> * possessing either false ID documents or equipment for making
>> them without a reasonable excuse on pain of imprisonment for upto 5
>> years.
>> * disclosing confidential NIR information without authorisation on
>> pain of upto 2 years imprisonment or a fine or both,
>> * providing false information to be included on the NIR or in
>> order to modify information on the NIR. The offence carries upto 2
>> years in prison, or a fine or both.
>> * tampering with the NIR, including any conduct making it more
>> difficult or impossible for the NIR information to be retrieved (e.g.
>> NIR operators going on strike?! The same operators making a mistake
>> that causes a crash?!). The offence carries upto 10 years in prison,
>> or a fine or both. See spy.org.uk's comments on this clause.''
>>
>> James
>>
>
> If you are a law abiding citizen and not planning to join an Al Queda cell
> what is the problem?
> It's a piece of plastic with a smart chip which confirms your identity,
> whoopy doo.
> With all the dodgy illegal immigrants wandering around the country I would
> carry a Identity Card with pride.

I would gladly sell my computer to pay for my ID card and sacrifice my time
on Usenet before genuflecting in front of an honest and selfless government
that only has my interests at heart.

Yours

Eric Honnecker

From:	JohnJ
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 10:40:45 +0000

"Dave" WROTE:
>If you are a law abiding citizen and not planning to join an Al Queda cell
>what is the problem?

The problem is the draconian nature of the regulations, e.g.

>>The card
>> holders may be ordered to attend a specific place at a specific time
>> and have biometric scans taken and to provide any information required
>> by the Home Secretary. Failure to comply can result in a civil penalty
>> of upto £1,000 pounds.

The fact that someone who has done nothing wrong can be ordered to
attend a government office to be "scanned" should alarm anyone. It
means that the citizen becomes the property of the government, rather
than the other way around.

>It's a piece of plastic with a smart chip which confirms your identity,

If it was just that, and it was voluntary, there would be no problem.

>With all the dodgy illegal immigrants wandering around the country I would
>carry a Identity Card with pride.

That would be up to you, but why do you want to force a card on others
who may not want it?

From:	Robert Peffers
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 11:59:26 -0000

"Dave" wrote in message
news:csvm81$b3r$1@hercules.btinternet.com...
>
> "James Hammerton" wrote in message
> news:saf5v05kjuinp217pf9bk9pbkfho3epph8@4ax.com...
>> From:
>>
>> http://jameshammerton.blogspot.com/2005/01/key-features-of-identity-cards-bill.html
>>
>> [For links goto web version at above URL]
>>
>> ``The Identity Cards Bill can be found online here, and its passage
>> through the House of Commons is due to finish on the 27th January. As
>> spy.org.uk points out at the previous link, with only 8 planned
>> sittings and such a short timetable for a complex bill with 184
>> amendments to consider, it is unlikely this legislation will receive
>> adequate scrutiny in the House of Commons. Once again it will be down
>> to the House of Lords to debate it more adequately.
>>
>> I shall summarise some of the key features of the bill here.
>> The National Identity Register(NIR)
>> Section 1 sets up the NIR, and together with Schedule 1 determines
>> what information will be stored on it. The information to be stored
>> includes:
>>
>> * a unique National Idenity Registration Number(NIRN) for each
>> person in the NIR.
>> * your date of birth, gender, full name and any other name you've
>> had.
>> * your current address plus every address you've ever lived at.
>> * your photo, signature and biometric scans.
>> * your residential status plus every previous residential status
>> you've had.
>> * details of any official identity documents issued to you,
>> * the history of all changes made to your NIR record,
>> * details of all ID cards issued to you, their validity, whether
>> you've been ordered to surrender them, etc.
>> * details of all the information you've provided to register on
>> the NIR and to apply for/renew your ID cards.
>> * details of every occasion on which the NIR entry has been
>> accessed by others. Note that when it becomes necessary to have your
>> ID card and NIR entry checked in order to access public services, this
>> item will thus record your usage of those services, e.g. what medical
>> services you've signed up for.
>>
>> Access to the information on the NIR
>> Note that where the Home Secretary gets powers to issue orders, the
>> orders must be approved by both Houses of Parliament, unless otherwise
>> stated.
>>
>> Section 14 allows the Home Secretary to disclose some of the
>> information on your NIR entry to you, or to someone else acting on
>> your behalf, for purposes of verification of the data if you apply to
>> for such access. The information you can get includes:
>>
>> * your name, date of birth, addresses and gender.
>> * your identifying numbers and the validity of your identifying
>> documents.
>> * your photo and signature.
>> * whether biometric scans taken from you matched the ones recorded
>> for you.
>>
>> The information you can access under this section does NOT include the
>> record of changes to your NIR entry or the record of who has accessed
>> your NIR entry. However, section 14(8) does permit access to the NIR
>> record using other legislation such as the Data Protection Act. It is
>> thus not clear whether an individual can get access to the record of
>> who has accessed their NIR entiry.
>>
>> Section 17 gives the Home Secretary the power to allow a person
>> providing a public service to access the NIR to verify your identity,
>> where the person is also authorised to check your ID card before
>> providing the service (see also Section 15 and 16).
>>
>> Section 19 sets out which public authorities can access NIR
>> information without your consent (see also Section 20):
>>
>> * MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (see the
>> Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill) will get access to all of the
>> information for the purposes of carrying out their functions.
>> * The Police, Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, will get
>> access to all the information, except the record of who has accessed
>> the NIR, in the interests of national security, for preventing or
>> detecting crime and for other purposes specified by order of the Home
>> Secretary. In the case of the IR and C&E they also get access for
>> carrying out their functions and investigating conduct that might
>> incur the penalties they can enforce.
>> * Government departments get access to all the information, except
>> the record of who has accessed the NIR, where the Home Secretary
>> prescribes it for the exercising/carrying out of any powers or duties
>> the deparment has by virtue of the Bill or for the
>> issuing/modification of official documents.
>>
>> Section 22 gives the Home Secretary the power to disclose specified
>> information to a specified individual for specified purposes, by
>> order.
>>
>> The obligations the bill imposes
>> Section 6 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel individuals
>> matching a specified description to register on the NIR and get a card
>> by order. Failure to comply incurs a civil penalty of upto £2500.
>>
>> Section 11 gives the Home Secretary the power to compel any person, by
>> order, to provide information for the purposes of verifying
>> information recorded, or due to be recorded, in the NIR, if he
>> believes the individual has that information in their possession.
>>
>> Section 12 requires ID card holders to notify the Home Secretary of
>> any changes of circumstances that affect their information on the NIR
>> and any error they become aware of in their NIR entry. The card
>> holders may be ordered to attend a specific place at a specific time
>> and have biometric scans taken and to provide any information required
>> by the Home Secretary. Failure to comply can result in a civil penalty
>> of upto £1,000 pounds.
>>
>> Section 13 requires people to notify the Home Secretary if their card
>> is lost, stolen, damaged, tampered with or destroyed. The Home
>> Secretary can cancel a card if it appears to him to be lost, stolen,
>> damaged, destroyed, tampered with, issued on the basis of incorrect or
>> incomplete info, the NIR entry has been modified, a change of
>> circumstances requires modification of the card or the card needs to
>> be reissued.
>>
>> A person in possession of someone else's card must surrender it as
>> soon as practical. The Home Secretary can require the surrender of a
>> card if it is possessed by someone other than the card holder, or the
>> card has been cancelled, expired or is otherwise invalid or if the
>> card is to be reissued or if was acquired invalidly.
>>
>> Damage is taken to include the card or anything on it having become
>> unreadable or unusable for any reason -- i.e. if the govt's card
>> reader damages your card, YOU are obliged to report the fact.
>>
>> Failure to surrender a card when ordered, or to notify the Home
>> Secretary of the loss, damage, tampering with, destruction of or
>> stealing of your card is an offence punishable by upto 51 weeks in
>> prison.
>>
>> Section 15 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
>> providing public services to require checking of the ID card before
>> allowing access to those services.
>>
>> Section 17 allows the Home Secretary to issue orders allowing those
>> providing public services to access information on the NIR to verify a
>> cardholder's identity.
>>
>> Sections 27 to 31 make offences of:
>>
>> * possessing either false ID documents or the equipment for making
>> false documents, with the intention of using the documents for
>> enrolment, on pain of upto 10 years imprisonment.
>> * possessing either false ID documents or equipment for making
>> them without a reasonable excuse on pain of imprisonment for upto 5
>> years.
>> * disclosing confidential NIR information without authorisation on
>> pain of upto 2 years imprisonment or a fine or both,
>> * providing false information to be included on the NIR or in
>> order to modify information on the NIR. The offence carries upto 2
>> years in prison, or a fine or both.
>> * tampering with the NIR, including any conduct making it more
>> difficult or impossible for the NIR information to be retrieved (e.g.
>> NIR operators going on strike?! The same operators making a mistake
>> that causes a crash?!). The offence carries upto 10 years in prison,
>> or a fine or both. See spy.org.uk's comments on this clause.''
>>
>> James
>>
>
> If you are a law abiding citizen and not planning to join an Al Queda cell
> what is the problem?
> It's a piece of plastic with a smart chip which confirms your identity,
> whoopy doo.
> With all the dodgy illegal immigrants wandering around the country I would
> carry a Identity Card with pride.
>
> Dave
>
>
Frae Auld Bob Peffers:
I don't disagree that a national identity card may be a desirable aim but I
know the Government already allows far too much of our private and personal
details to be accessed by far too many organizations and individuals.

Consider this. Your medical records are being placed on a National data
base. You must, if you are a driver, insure your vehicle. The Insurance
Companies have some of your personal data already and it is obvious they
share this data. Pay attention to your junk mail when you have insurance
falling due for renewal and you will find a sudden increase in the bumph
from insurers. What if these insurers also get hold of your medical records?
If every medical practice has access to these medical records these insurers
can surely find a doctor's office staff member. or hospital staff,
somewhere in these Isles who will access anyone's medical records for a
payment. Can we trust everyone with access to our medical records? What
about someone applying for life insurance having their medical records read
by someone in an insurance office?

Last year the government changed the law to allow one government department
to access data on other department's data bases. Thus the Benefits people
can cross-reference the Inland Revenue's data base, the DVLA's and so on.
There will be some very surprised business people when they are hauled into
court for many of the evasions that have been practiced for so many years.
Just imagine if the IR gets information from a persons bank accounts and
cross-references these with their own records and store loyalty cards and
finds the person is spending more in the stores than they have declared as
an income. If you can trust a government that has made normal citizens into
criminals with on the spot, no defence against, fines like dropping a tiny
bit of litter or breaking some arcane driving rule, or being late getting
back to a parking meter you are in the minority. Remember that these people
handing out the on the spot fines are NOT police people. In many cases they
are employees of local councils who use the OTS fines to boost their income.
It is a fact that there are far more people who get a criminal record due to
these OTS fines than get it from murder, assault, theft, GBH, rape, drunk or
drug driving and many other serious crimes.

We cannot allow our data to be accessed by everyone and the history of
national data bases is riddled with breaches of security. There are many
recorded cases of DVLA records being accessed by such as private
investigators and even by media investigators digging the dirt on people.
--

Aefauldlie, (Scots word for Honestly),
Robert, (Auld Bob), Peffers,
Kelty,
Fife,
Scotland, (UK).
Web Site, "The Eck's Files":- http://www.peffers50.freeserve.co.uk

--

Aefauldlie, (Scots word for Honestly),
Robert, (Auld Bob), Peffers,
Kelty,
Fife,
Scotland, (UK).
Web Site, "The Eck's Files":- http://www.peffers50.freeserve.co.uk

From:	JohnJ
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 12:21:49 +0000

"Robert Peffers" WROTE:

>I don't disagree that a national identity card may be a desirable aim

But only for the government! There's no benefit from a compulsory card
for the rest of us.

From:	Robert Peffers
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 13:57:54 -0000

"JohnJ" wrote in message
news:ij57v0pgbsuhl0hmfv9j1vtrn1tpuc8g98@4ax.com...
> "Robert Peffers" WROTE:
>
>>I don't disagree that a national identity card may be a desirable aim
>
> But only for the government! There's no benefit from a compulsory card
> for the rest of us.

Frae Auld Bob Peffers:
That is, of course, utter nonsense. Lets give some great advantages for,
"The rest of us".
A person dies anywhere that they are normally a stranger to - Their
relatives can be found with ease. Someone has an accident and ends in
hospital while non compos mentis. Their loved ones can be informed easily. A
person is raped, male or female, the DNA will find the culprit. Murder cases
are easier to solve. All crimes will be easier to solve with a DNA database.
Fraud will become harder to commit and easier to catch the culprit. Forward
planning by both local and central government will be better. There will be
no need ever for a national census. Crimes such as fake trades people and
social workers will be wiped out. Kidnapping and theft of children will
stop as there is no way for false identity to be set up. One of the biggest
rises in crime in the last few years has been identity theft. The cases of
stolen donor body parts and their sale to rich recipients will stop. When it
is necessary to find donors for those unfortunate to need blood or other
transplants, (i.e. bone marrow). The list is endless.

However, the problems are not the actual cards that will be issued. It is
type of data in the data base and the other uses it can be put to that
causes the problems. There is also the problems involve in preventing
illegal access to the data base. Just consider the rise in computer based
crimes, phishing, for instance. We are all already being put on a national
computerised medical records computer data base. Can you imagine the number
of people who will have access to everyone's medical records? Bear in mind
that one of the modern problems within the UK is the rapid rise in STD.
There is then the added problem of the cross-referencing of different
organizations and private individuals. Remember that yesterday there was the
obvious warning that Wireless networks were easy to access by anyone in the
neighbourhood. Now it may surprise you to hear this one but given the
correct equipment anyone can gain some access to any computer for they all
give of radiations. For example every keyboard communicates with the main
computer with a standard set of digital codes. No matter how it sends that
data it radiates a signal. Telephone lines are also subject to radiating
signals when any signal is sent down the wire. The biggest problem is thus
abuse of the data either by government itself or by others, It is far worse
that with a paper based system that needed physical access to the written
data. Paper based data has always suffered from abuses. Electronic stuff is
very much more vulnerable to abuse. Can we really trust any government to
protect our privacy?
--

Aefauldlie, (Scots word for Honestly),
Robert, (Auld Bob), Peffers,
Kelty,
Fife,
Scotland, (UK).
Web Site, "The Eck's Files":- http://www.peffers50.freeserve.co.uk

From:	Deirdre Sholto Douglas
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 11:49:46 -0600

Robert Peffers wrote:
>
> "JohnJ" wrote in message
> news:ij57v0pgbsuhl0hmfv9j1vtrn1tpuc8g98@4ax.com...
> > "Robert Peffers" WROTE:
> >
> >>I don't disagree that a national identity card may be a desirable aim
> >
> > But only for the government! There's no benefit from a compulsory card
> > for the rest of us.
>
> Frae Auld Bob Peffers:
> That is, of course, utter nonsense. Lets give some great advantages for,
> "The rest of us".

All predicated on the idea that the card is in the
possession of the person requiring identification.
Which, in the case of murder or other heinous act
is unlikely. Of course, you failed to mention the
Whole! New! Industry which will arise...that of
fraudulent ID cards. Of course, the new crime of
not carrying identification (compulsory means
just that) should provide a nice cash flow to the
government coffers. One wonders what the fine
for being a scofflaw would be?

The US has what amounts to a "national identity
card" in the form of a Social Security card. All
citizens have them issued at age two (otherwise
the parents can't claim them as dependents on
their taxes). One would think this cuts through
the entire mess of ID, carry the card, they know
who you are..._except_ for one tiny detail. If the
card is stolen (along with a wallet) there goes the
identity...as a result people are instructed _not_
to carry the one card which is uniquely theirs.

"Papers, please." is the sign of a regime leaning
towards totalitarianism...and usually precedes
the loss of personal rights. People who allow
themselves to be led like sheep, have no call
being surprised when they find themselves in
an abattoir.

Deirdre

From:	James Hammerton
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 16:27:09 +0000

On Sun, 23 Jan 2005 13:57:54 -0000, "Robert Peffers"
wrote:

>
>"JohnJ" wrote in message
>news:ij57v0pgbsuhl0hmfv9j1vtrn1tpuc8g98@4ax.com...
>> "Robert Peffers" WROTE:
>>
>>>I don't disagree that a national identity card may be a desirable aim
>>
>> But only for the government! There's no benefit from a compulsory card
>> for the rest of us.
>
>Frae Auld Bob Peffers:
>That is, of course, utter nonsense. Lets give some great advantages for,
>"The rest of us".
>A person dies anywhere that they are normally a stranger to - Their
>relatives can be found with ease.

That can be achieved with existing voluntary documentation, much of
which we carry with us anyway. And these days many people carry
devices with them that store the phone numbers of friends and families
to -- their mobiles.

> Someone has an accident and ends in
>hospital while non compos mentis.

And how would a national ID card help here?

> Their loved ones can be informed easily. A
>person is raped, male or female, the DNA will find the culprit.

What's DNA got to do with the ID cards bill?

> Murder cases
>are easier to solve.

Why?

> All crimes will be easier to solve with a DNA database.

We're not talking about a DNA database -- the bill does not propose
one.

And I'm not convinced all crimes would be easier to solve with that.

Finding someone's DNA at the scene of a crime only proves they were at
the scene of the crime at some point, and even then there's the
possibility that the DNA was taken from the person and dropped there
to frame him. Still DNA is useful evidence, but if *everyone* has
their DNA on a database then:

* the probability of a false match greatly increases, indeed it will
be a near certainty that comparing a random person's DNA to a database
of tens of millions of people will yield false matches. And if the
culprit didn't leave DNA at the scene of the crime, he will not be in
the list of matches.

* criminals will know that they can throw the police of the scent by
getting anyone's DNA (e.g. visit a barber shop and take some cuttings)
and sprinkling it at the scene.

* criminals will also be more careful not to leave their own DNA
around.

Having everyone's DNA on the database will devalue DNA as evidence.

>Fraud will become harder to commit and easier to catch the culprit.

Please explain the steps by which the national ID card will prevent
fraud.

> Forward
>planning by both local and central government will be better.

Huh?

> There will be
>no need ever for a national census. Crimes such as fake trades people and
>social workers will be wiped out.

Do explain how.

> Kidnapping and theft of children will
>stop as there is no way for false identity to be set up.

Sorry but there are ways for false identity to be set up under the
govt's proposals. Apply for the ID under that false ID using existing
(easier to forge) documentation.

Fingerprints can be forged:

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/16/gummi_bears_defeat_fingerprint_sensors/

Iris scanners have been fooled with nothing more sophisticated than a
printout of a persons Irises with holes where the pupils are and
someone looking through it -- just imagine what a carefully designed
set of contact lenses could do:

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/23/biometric_sensors_beaten_senseless/

And the govt's proposals will involve thousands of daily transactions
where the biometric information is scanned and transmitted to central
computers, creating plenty of opportunity (from those operating the
system if no one else) to capture the info for such purposes.

Plus those maintaining the database could be bribed/intimidated into
modifying entries to enable false identities or identity theft.

And that's before considering whether the biometric technology is
capable of the job. Unfortunately, even with a 1 in a billion false
match rate, you'll end up with 10s of thousands of false matches
generated per year once the database has grown to say 20 million
entries as people enroll. The government's got to somehow distinguish
them for attempts to enroll multiple times under different IDs if the
system's to stand a chance of working.

E.g. given a 1 in a billion false positive rate and 20 million
entries. The probability that the next enrolment will yield a false
match will be roughly 1.98% (subtract 1 in a billion from 1 to get the
probability of no false match. Raise the answer to the power of 20
million. Subtract this answer from 1 to get the probability of a false
match, multiply by 100 to get the percentage).

The next 5 million additions will result in over 99000 false matches.
I say over 99000 because the figure doesn't take into account that the
probability will rise with each new addition.

Note that the government intends to roll these cards out by 2012 AIUI.
For 46 million adults, that leaves less than 7 years to roll out and
requires more than 6 million enrolments per yer.

How is the govt to distinguish the false matches from attempts to fool
the system? It can only rely on existing methods and either they're
clearly inadequate or a new system wouldn't be needed.

> One of the biggest
>rises in crime in the last few years has been identity theft. The cases of
>stolen donor body parts and their sale to rich recipients will stop. When it
>is necessary to find donors for those unfortunate to need blood or other
>transplants, (i.e. bone marrow). The list is endless.

And your statements are hopelessly naive.

>However, the problems are not the actual cards that will be issued.

It is if everyday life becomes impossible to live without them -- such
a card is not a mere means of identifying yourself, it is an internal
passport and a licence to live, revokable by the government at any
time.

[snip]

> Can we really trust any government to
>protect our privacy?

No. E.g. see:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2662491.stm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/staffordshire/3951945.stm

James

From:	Ian Smith
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 03:03:41 -0000

From:	Richard White
Subject:	Re: Key features of the Identity Cards Bill
Date:	Sun, 23 Jan 2005 23:50:46 -0000

"James Hammerton" wrote in message
news:saf5v05kjuinp217pf9bk9pbkfho3epph8@4ax.com...
> From:
[...snipped...]
> I shall summarise some of the key features of the bill here.
> The National Identity Register(NIR)
> Section 1 sets up the NIR, and together with Schedule 1 determines
> what information will be stored on it. The information to be stored
> includes:
>
> * a unique National Idenity Registration Number(NIRN) for each
> person in the NIR.
> * your date of birth, gender, full name and any other name you've
> had.
I take it that extra genders are available for those born with indeterminant ? Wonder what they
do with tranuals? Their *gender* doesn't change, just their appearance and uality.

> * your current address plus every address you've ever lived at.
Could be fun - can't remember my previous addresses LOL.
How will they be verified?
(Even the present one, let alone previous)

> * your photo, signature and biometric scans.

> * your residential status plus every previous residential status
> you've had.
Presumably only for foreigners.
Is this how the Home Sec will be able to round up the "untermenschen" (ie. illegal immigrants) and
send them off to camps?

God help us if EDS gets to computerise this lot!!!!

> * details of any official identity documents issued to you,
How will they know of them? I never had an NIRN when they were issued - and won't need any more
(except perhaps replacement passport)

> * the history of all changes made to your NIR record,
> * details of all ID cards issued to you, their validity, whether
> you've been ordered to surrender them, etc.
"All ID cards" ??? How many Identities am I going to have???????

> * details of all the information you've provided to register on
> the NIR and to apply for/renew your ID cards.
> * details of every occasion on which the NIR entry has been
> accessed by others. Note that when it becomes necessary to have your
> ID card and NIR entry checked in order to access public services, this
> item will thus record your usage of those services, e.g. what medical
> services you've signed up for.
[...snipped...]

Notice also how the use of ID cards in Germany DIDN'T stop 9/11 being planned there .... or the Red
Army Faction in the 1970s

Notice also how the use of ID cards in Spain DIDN'T stop the Al-Qaeda Madrid train bombings