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Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2005 13:39:16 -0500
Subject: TALK:Friday 1-14-05 Trustworthy Electronic Election Results without Trusted Machines
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Trustworthy Electronic Election Results without Trusted Machines
Cryptography and Information Security Seminar Series 2004/2005
Speaker: Andy Neff
Speaker Affiliation: VoteHere, Inc.
Host: Ron Rivest
Host Affiliation: CIS, CSAIL, MIT
Date: 1-14-2005
Time: 2:00 PM - 4:30 PM
Location: 32-D463 (Star)
Electronic devices and systems potentially offer many of the same
benefits to the process of conducting elections that they have already
delivered to the worlds of business and finance.
Unfortunately, the requirement for ballot secrecy, along with the high
degree of complexity possible in today's devices, makes it impossible
for the general voting population to directly infer that systems
tasked with collecting and counting votes are behaving accurately and
honestly.
Recently, verifiable mix net and homomorphic tabulation protocols
have effectively solved the problem of publicly counting encrypted
ballots, thereby eliminating the need to trust special vote counters
-- people or machines.
Our focus in this talk will be on describing a new protocol,
executable by voters while in the poll booth, that eliminates the need
for voters to trust the vote casting devices (DREs) as well.
By way of a challenge-response scheme, the voting device is prevented
from casting an encrypted ballot which is inconsistent with the
voter's intent without showing contradictory evidence which the voter
can easily detect by simple inspection.
To prevent vote tampering after ballots have been cast, each voter
is given a receipt which can be used to audit the public ballot box.
However, because part of the voter's proof of ballot correctness is
derived from direct observation in the poll booth of the temporal
sequence by which the receipt is formed, the receipt is meaningless to
someone else -- even when the voter is faced with the threat of
coercion.
Hence we may obtain for our large scale secret ballot elections the
same certainty one obtains when counting a simple show of hands.
Relevant URL(S):
For more information please contact:
Be Blackburn, 3-6098, imbe at mit.edu
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