 | http://www.dawn.com/2005/01/17/op.htm#1
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
17 January 2005 Monday 06 Zilhaj 1425
Kashmir policy revisited
By Javid Husain
...... Pakistan has been engaged in changing in its favour the status
quo, which has existed in Kashmir for more than five decades.
In the prevalent power-based international system, this objective can
be achieved only if Pakistan mobilizes sufficient power in support of
its cause at national, regional and global levels to persuade India to
modify its stand that Kashmir is its integral part and come to a
mutually satisfactory settlement of the dispute taking into account the
wishes of the Kashmiri people.
International law and morality, can, at best, play a marginal role in
overcoming Indian intransigence. Let us see how Pakistan compares with
India in terms of national power.
India is not only eight times bigger than Pakistan in population terms,
it has consistently outperformed Pakistan in the economic field during
the past decade. The situation on the military side is no different
despite the high proportion of the national resources that Pakistan has
allocated to defence.
India also enjoys the advantage of a stable democratic setup which has
taken deep roots in its bodypolitik, as against Pakistan which has
suffered from political instability marked by controversies about the
Constitution, stunted growth of political institutions, repeated
experiments with military and authoritarian governments and a low level
of political maturity.
The situation at the regional and global levels is also not reassuring
from Pakistan's point of view. At the regional level, Pakistan managed
to isolate itself primarily because of its flawed Afghanistan policy,
particularly during the period from 1997 to September 2001.
Without going into details, it is sufficient to say that we are still
living both internally and externally with the adverse consequences of
that short sighted policy.
At the global level again, Pakistan is faced with heavy odds as far as
the Kashmir dispute is concerned. Even if we ignore the lingering
misgivings of the international community because of our pre-9/11
support to the Taliban, a quick survey of the international scene
should have a sobering effect on Pakistan's policymakers.
As a result of the radical transformation of the international
environment in the aftermath of 9/11, issues of terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been raised to the
top of the international agenda.
Promotion of democracy, safeguarding of human rights and development of
a market economy constitute other important objectives of the
international community. The focus on the issue of terrorism has
undermined the freedom movements in the Islamic world as the armed
struggle here is increasingly portrayed by the West as terrorism.
The reduced relevance of the United Nations to global and regional
issues of strategic importance, as in the case of the US invasion of
Iraq, has correspondingly reduced the significance of UN Security
Council resolutions for the peaceful settlement of international
disputes.
Increasingly now, decisions on important strategic issues are taken
elsewhere by the major powers and then taken to the Security Council to
give them a cloak of legitimacy. This trend has had a negative impact
on the UN Security Council resolutions relevant to Kashmir. Pakistan,
then, lacks the power to compel or persuade India to agree to a change
in the status quo in Kashmir.
It is not surprising that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared
unequivocally at Srinagar on November 17, 2004: "Let me say that I have
made it quite clear to President Musharraf that any redrawing of
international borders is something which is not going to be acceptable
to us. Any proposal which smacks of further division of our country on
the basis of religion is not going to be acceptable to us."
The point was reiterated by him in Lok Sabha on December 21. Later in
Rajya Sabha, Dr Singh added that he had emphasized to President
Musharraf the criticality of his fulfilling the reassurance of January
6, 2004, that any territory under Pakistan's control would not be used
to support terrorism in any manner. He went on to declare that "If this
does not happen, all other confidence-building measures would have no
meaning."
The Indian foreign secretary was equally blunt while talking to a group
of Pakistani journalists in New Delhi last month. If there was any
doubt left in the minds of our policymakers, the Indian foreign
secretary removed it by stressing in Islamabad at a press conference on
December 27 that "legally entire Jammu and Kashmir is part of India."
Little wonder that the latest round of Pakistan-India foreign
secretary-level talks ended without any progress on the Kashmir issue.
......
...... Our historical experience and the present situation call for a
radical revision of our Kashmir policy which should be based on a
long-term strategy. We need to recognize that a peaceful settlement of
the Kashmir dispute, which is satisfactory from Pakistan's point of
view, is not attainable in the short-term as Pakistan is in a much
weaker position compared with India nationally, regionally and
internationally.
Further, such a settlement would require painful compromises by both
India and Pakistan. The fact of the matter is that there is no national
consensus on the necessary concessions either in India or in Pakistan.
The statements by the Indian prime minister and foreign secretary
reflect this reality as far as India is concerned. The situation is not
much different in Pakistan. Both sides, therefore, need more time to
prepare their respective public opinions for the necessary flexibility
in dealing with the Kashmir issue. It would be a long-term process
whose outcome cannot be predicted with certainty at this time. .....
...... Finally, we need to remind ourselves that the Kashmiris are at
the centre of the dispute. Any settlement of the Kashmir dispute which
runs contrary to the wishes of the Kashmiri people cannot be viable or
sustainable.
We must, therefore, develop a deep understanding of their aspirations
by maintaining close political links with their political leadership
and avoid taking steps which would alienate them.
Above all, we should make Pakistan so attractive from the points of
view of political stability, economic development and cultural growth
that it should act as a magnate for the Kashmiri people.
In the long run, our ability to reach a satisfactory settlement of the
Kashmir issue with India would be directly proportionate to our success
in strengthening our internal political stability and outperforming
India in the field of economic development while maintaining a credible
military deterrent at the lowest possible cost.
Our inability to perform well in these areas would make the prospects
of a satisfactory settlement of the Kashmir dispute extremely bleak if
not non-existent.
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